The UK announced it would hold a referendum on its membership of the EU in 2013, when the country’s economy was doing well and had recovered from the 2008 financial crisis. Still, in 2016, the country voted to leave. The world was shocked. I was working within the UK government at this time, which showed me how unprepared officials were to handle this outcome.

However, over the next few years, the UK got to work and negotiated its exit for February 2020. Even after the formal exit from the EU, the country remained in the single market until the end of 2020. The reality of implementing these changes for businesses required more time to lessen the economic fallout.

Post-Brexit is a different story. The country is dealing with a shallow recession, high inflation and a modest economic growth of 0.3 percent this year, according to the OECD. While the pandemic and the war in Ukraine compounded Brexit’s negative economic shock, it’s not the only reason public opinion is shifting.

Leading Brexiter Boris Johnson was ousted from British politics last year, mainly due to his personal misconduct. But this was still a signal of the changing tides for Conservatives. Why? Simple demographic math. Tragically, among those most vulnerable to COVID-19 were the elderly. By the time another referendum could be called, many more will not be around to vote again. Younger Brits are more likely to support the EU. This, combined with constant political changes (like Liz Truss lasting only 44 days as prime minister) has increased the number of voters who doubt the government’s ability to take back control.

Many Brexiters’ support is wavering, but is a second referendum likely? The short answer is no. The pandemic and the war in Ukraine have provided the perfect scapegoat for the country’s current economic woes. Faithful Brexiters can use this excuse to point out how well the country is faring compared to some of its European colleagues. With Germany experiencing a recession and unrest in France, why should the UK rejoin the struggling EU?

And my friends in Westminster tell me another referendum is not being discussed. At least, not seriously. Labour can’t be seen to rock boats, and Prime Minister Rishi Sunak is a true Brexit believer.

What really matters is what will happen in the next decade. Will new free trade agreements alleviate the current economic concerns? How well will the Windsor Framework, adopted in March, solve the border issue between Northern Ireland and the EU? The Framework isn’t much more than an economic cushion, designed to improve the flow of goods between the UK and Northern Ireland. But it won’t be fully implemented until 2025. Suffice to say, the long divorce continues.

Could the UK even rejoin the EU if it wanted to? Let’s imagine that down the road another EU referendum did occur and the British public voted to rejoin. Much like the fateful Brexit vote, it’s not a simple yes or no. Some EU member states may reject the UK — after all, there’s precedent from the French, who voted against the UK’s application for membership in the European Economic Community in 1963 and 1967. In addition, member states could require new members to join the eurozone, which may be anathema for Brits who have always preferred their pound sterling. There is also no precedent for a country that has left the EU to rejoin, which means new processes must be established and new rules negotiated. All this will take time. Ultimately, Britain rejoining the EU depends on much more than just London.

A lot could change between now and a possible future referendum, which may cause the UK to recalculate its desire to be a part of the EU. Another war might convince wavering Brits to rejoin. Or climate-related chaos might devastate economies and convince them to stay out. One day Brexit may well be reversed. But that is a long way away, if at all.

What we do know is that Brits are stuck with Brexit … for now.

Katelyn Greer is the former Chief Communication Officer on Brexit, Trade and the Economy for the British Embassy in Washington, D.C. She is now the principal of Greer Group LLC.

The near downfall of the 107-year-old PGA at the hands of a foreign government is but one example of America’s waning cultural influence. Even with their deep pockets, it is hard to imagine the Saudis making this attempt a decade or even just five years ago.

There are other signs U.S. cultural influence is ebbing. Hollywood studios, Disney theme parks and the NBA have all come under fire for making concessions to Chinese censorship. Young Americans are just as likely to encounter content from Chinese-owned TikTok as from a U.S. movie or TV show. And Korean pop music, or K-pop, now has a good claim to being the most popular music in the world.

As the world realigns in the post-Cold War era, our cultural influence is a key factor that will help to determine whether we can build a new international system aligned with American interests. We need to use every resource we can to give our soft power a boost, including state support — something for which there is plenty of precedent in diplomatic history and U.S. policy.

On the defensive after Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, the great diplomat Talleyrand used French cuisine to entice Prussia, Russia and England to the table — quite literally. Begging for support from Paris to his embassy at the Vienna peace conference, Talleyrand is said to have quipped, “Sire, I need saucepans more than written instructions!” Talleyrand got his saucepans, and the result was a treaty that stabilized Europe for a century.

At the Cold War’s start, it was Eisenhower himself who added “American” to the name of the Ballet Theatre in New York, creating the ABT, which still tours the world. At the same time, MoMA began to mount touring exhibits of Abstract Expressionist painting to showcase American creativity, which Kennedy later formalized as the Art in Embassies program. Now, the Art in Embassies collection has work by 20,000 artists.

Up to now, the U.S. has largely kept pace with our rivals. Yet in the Belt and Road project that extends through Africa and Southeast Asia, the Chinese government is promoting the arts and academic exchanges alongside infrastructure. The global Russian propaganda machine is relentless, as are their systematic attempts to destroy Ukrainian culture. That the majority of countries in the Global South do not agree with the U.S. policy in Ukraine suggests that something about the Russian influence strategy is working.

Right now, our cultural diplomacy is anchored in the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, which does outstanding and essential work with only about $770 million of funding. By contrast, as of 2017, it is estimated that the Chinese government spent $10 billion.

We need more financing and to expand our horizons. One way forward is to capitalize on our existing strengths, like education. The State Department in the past has estimated that 300 current and former heads of state were educated in America. Education is a service export, creating jobs here at home and influencing the next generation of leaders around the world. Yet the recruitment of foreign university students is not guided by any long-term strategy.

There is also a rich opportunity in public-private partnerships. Why not incentivize a world-famous museum like MoMA, which already partners with private companies and international artists, to open branches in other nations, as the Louvre has done in Abu Dhabi? The same could be said for The Getty, the Smithsonian and The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, all among the top 10 most-visited museums in the world.

Some branches of the Smithsonian — in particular the National Museum of the Native American and the National Museum of African American History and Culture — could be a great way to showcase the breadth and richness of American culture, a unique strength of ours.

It has been a long time since Talleyrand’s saucepans. Cultural diplomacy now has many digital tools available to it. To make use of them, we can launch hybrid or virtual artists exchanges, or recruit foreign students to U.S. online educational programs. American performing arts companies and museums still struggling to rebuild post-COVID could become “digital touring companies,” mounting live-streamed performances geared toward specific foreign audiences.

With the explosion of AI-enabled internet, online gaming, new social media platforms, and augmented reality in the near future, there are unlimited options for what a digital cultural diplomacy policy could look like. The challenge is to expand our efforts to experiment early, to be ready for whatever medium scales next.

All of these new efforts rest on an old truth: that alliances are not built only on shared economic and military interest. There are always flesh-and-blood human beings on the other side of the negotiating table. It is only by consistently displaying the best of America that we can keep them there.

Fred P. Hochberg served as chairman of the United States Export-Import Bank under President Obama from 2009 to 2017. He is the author of “Trade is Not a Four-Letter Word: How Six Everyday Products Make the Case for Trade.” He is currently chair of Meridian International Center, a D.C.-based nonprofit.

Still, leaders of both countries have shared a gnawing resentment of their treatment by the West. Turkey was deemed a candidate member of the EU in 1999 and then watched 10 former communist countries join as its own application languished. Russia was not even in the queue, but virtually all of its neighbors have been wooed by both the EU and NATO. Fiona Hill and Omer Taspinar deemed this shared partnership the “Axis of the Excluded” in 2006.

At various times this relationship produced substantial gains. When Russian forces invaded Georgia in 2008 and resected parts of that country into two statelets, Turkish authorities blocked the U.S. Navy from sending ships through the Turkish Straits, enforcing a right granted by the 1936 treaty of Montreux. From 2016 to 2022, Turkish-Russian trade grew fivefold to the point where Russia became Turkey’s largest trading partner. Russia supplied the new Turkstream pipeline with gas destined for Europe, helping Turkey become an “energy hub” and allowing Russian exports to bypass Ukraine. Russian tourists flocked to resorts in Antalya and Izmir; more than five million did so in 2021.

The Russian-Turkish relationship is backstopped by deeply personal ties between Recep Erdogan and Vladimir Putin. After the Turkish air force shot down a Russian jet in 2015 and Putin imposed economic sanctions, the Turkish president made a pilgrimage to Moscow to apologize, and economic ties resumed.

While Russian-Turkish relations blossomed, tensions grew with the United States. There have been many issues, including American support for Kurds fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq, but the low point came with the 2017 agreement by Turkey to buy and install Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles. The deal produced worries about NATO’s defense in a key global area and provoked sanctions by the U.S. The sale of newer F-16 aircraft was blocked, and Turkey was excluded from the new F-35 fighter program.         

As a centrally located “middle power” in a dangerous and changing neighborhood, Turkey must be nimble in its policies. The end of the Cold War decreased its strategic value as U.S. priorities shifted toward Asia. At the same time, the growing power of an expanding European Union attracted Ankara. At first this had Erdogan’s blessing, but steady movement away from democratic rule set the country back and the EU membership process stalled. After a crackdown following the 2016 coup attempt, negotiations were suspended along with those on revising a customs union that Turkey has long criticized as unequal. While the European Parliament has passed several resolutions criticizing Turkish practices on human rights and the erosion of democratic institutions, ties with Moscow come with no such judgments. They also act as a reminder to Washington and Brussels that Ankara has alternatives.

Among those is a rising China. Turkey’s size, strategic location and links to Europe make it attractive to Chinese investment and an active consumer of Chinese products. China is now the largest provider of imports to Turkey (and the leading source of its trade deficit). Investments have multiplied and include Kumport, Turkey’s third largest port. For a time, Erdogan was careful to mute criticism of China’s suppression of its Turkic-speaking Uighur population.

Turkey’s ability to balance all of these pressures has been tested by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ankara has not supported Western sanctions and, along with China, provides a crucial outlet for the export of Russian oil and gas. At the same time, Turkey blocked the Black Sea to Russian warships in 2022 and successfully brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative that, until recently, allowed export of Ukrainian grain and agricultural products. Less well advertised is Turkey’s provision of key war materiel to Ukraine, including drones. Earlier this month, Turkey allowed the repatriation of five commanders of Ukraine's Azov Battalion, leaders in the defense of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol. They had been remanded to Turkey in a prisoner exchange with Russia but were allowed to return home, to Moscow's annoyance.

The war has contributed to a sharp challenge to the power and status of these two of Ankara’s friends. China’s slowed economic and population growth, unbalanced international accounts and crippling Covid lockdown have disrupted trade and investment. Bullying associated with China’s flagging Belt and Road Initiative and, most of all, its support for the Russian invasion, have produced the most negative international views of that country in years. Russia’s failures are obvious and include the murderous and disastrous war in Ukraine, a stagnant and sanctioned economy, huge intellectual and capital flight and, most recently, a rebellion of mercenaries that featured an almost unopposed march toward Moscow. A wounded and weakened Putin could sure use a stalwart friend. Today, that is not Recep Erdogan.

For more than a year, Ankara had been blocking Sweden’s NATO membership, pressing it to suppress the activities of what it sees as Kurdish terrorists. Then, just before the NATO summit in Vilnius, Turkish objections were abruptly dropped and Sweden’s membership virtually assured. At a stroke, NATO gained control of almost the entire Baltic littoral, greatly improving its strategic position and ability to defend the Baltic members and the European far north. Another of Putin’s nightmares just came to life.

In return for its acquiescence, Turkey will be allowed to buy the newer American F-16 jets. Sweden amended its constitution and change its laws and, as a bonus, agreed to support Turkey’s aspirations to join the EU. The value of such promises remains to be seen — the U.S. arms sales will still need congressional approval — and serious progress with the EU seems unlikely. Nevertheless, this agreement reflects the change in Turkey’s global calculus. Ever nimble and facing a changing global balance of power, Turkey did what’s best for Turkey.

These actions reflect the foreign policy sentiments of no less an authority than former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (and before him, British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston) who said, “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.”

As in Washington, so in Ankara. Stalwart friends will just have to understand.

Ronald H. Linden is a retired professor of Political Science and Director of European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. He is co-author of “Turkey and its Neighbors” and “co-editor of Turkey in Transition.”

Herzog is a fig leaf, putting a kinder, gentler face on Israeli apartheid and the most extreme government in Israel’s history. Last year was the deadliest year for Palestinians in the West Bank since 2005, and this year is on pace to be even worse, with more than 140 killed by Israeli soldiers and settlers so far. In just the first six months of 2023, Israel has already broken the annual record for new settlement units, and responsibility for Israel's illegal settlement enterprise has been shifted to civilian oversight — in effect de facto annexing the occupied West Bank — all under Herzog’s watch.

Herzog’s invitation, extended last year by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) and then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) to mark the 75th anniversary of Israel’s founding, appears meant to silence Israel’s critics from the top down. The critics could not be defeated at the popular level as evidenced by a recent Gallup poll showing that, for the first time, a majority of Democrats sympathize more with Palestinians than Israelis. To stem the momentum of progressive movements, pro-Israel lobby groups have ramped up their efforts to adopt legislation intended to suppress the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement for Palestinian rights, as well as the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition equating criticism of Israel to antisemitism.

The recent attacks on Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.) are part of this effort.

Over the weekend, Jayapal told a Chicago audience something quite plain: that “Israel is a racist state.” Her words should not be controversial. Legacy and Israeli human rights organizations, together with United Nations agencies, committees and multiple independent studies, have all concluded that Israel oversees an apartheid regime. Legislated as a crime against humanity in 1973 and again in the 1998 Rome Statute, apartheid is, by definition, established “for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them." If it is apartheid, it is racist.

The rebuke of Jayapal ignores the overwhelming empirical evidence and analytical findings of the world’s most renowned human rights advocates and scholars. Following the backlash from Israel’s supporters, including several of her fellow Democratic members of Congress, Jayapal amended her statement to describe Israel’s government, rather than the Israeli nation, as racist.

Ironically, there is no such thing as an Israeli national — this is the crux of the matter.

Israel is not, and has never been, a state of its citizens. Under Israeli law, which bifurcates Jewish nationality and Israeli citizenship, a Jewish teen in Lisbon who just discovered Israel on a map has more rights in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories than an 80-year-old Palestinian woman born in what became Israel before it was established in 1948.

Native Palestinians who became citizens in Israel — and make up more than 20 percent of its population — are not only second-class citizens, they are rendered present-absent to facilitate their ongoing dispossession. In 2018, Israel’s parliament adopted the Jewish Nation-State Law, declaring that only Jews have the right to self-determination in Palestine/Israel. A year later, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said it even more plainly: Israel is “the national state, not of all of its citizens, but only of the Jewish people.”

Yet for the U.S. elected officials singing Israel’s praise, it is as if none of this has happened. As if Israel did not torpedo the Palestinian state as well as the possibility of binationalism; did not declare unilateral sovereignty over Jerusalem; or allow three settler pogroms against Palestinian villages. It's as if a robust social movement featuring Black and Palestinian solidarity that has affirmed joint struggle and helped catapult progressive Democrats into office never took place. As if Israeli leaders themselves did not call it apartheid and become sidelined by an extremist government intent on upending an independent Israeli judiciary.

It may as well be 1987, when Herzog’s father, Chaim Herzog, addressed Congress, or 2000, when the Oslo negotiations collapsed at Camp David. U.S. official rhetoric is the same, even though so much has fundamentally changed. There exists an apartheid reality in Israel and rather than contend with this, Israel’s most ardent defenders want to normalize and exemplify it.

In their invitation to Herzog, Sen. Schumer and Speaker Pelosi referred to the founding of Israel as a “historic and joyous milestone” to be celebrated. They fail to acknowledge that exclusive Zionist sovereignty necessitated the ethnic cleansing of three-quarters of all Palestinians from their homeland to make way for a Jewish majority state, known to Palestinians as the Nakba (catastrophe), and that their systematic erasure continues into the present. The ongoing Nakba and the massive suffering it inflicts on Palestinians is nothing to be celebrated.

Herzog might be considered a moderate by the right-wing standards of Israeli politics, but that says little. He does not even oppose the West Bank settlement enterprise, considered illegal by international diplomatic consensus and now up for scrutiny as a war crime before the International Criminal Court. Congress should be discussing measures of accountability, rather than normalizing the apartheid of our time.

At least five progressive members of the House have said they will boycott Herzog’s address, as many did with the recent address by Indian Prime Minister Modi. Others should join their principled stand and skip Herzog’s speech.

Nelson Mandela once said that the freedom of South Africans is incomplete without the freedom of Palestinians. So too is the case for progressive movements in the United States. Abandoning Palestinians is not a pragmatic option — it is only self-defeating and harmful precisely at a time when the tide is turning.

A human rights attorney, Noura Erakat is associate professor at Rutgers University and author of “Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine.”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had removed his opposition to Sweden’s NATO accession as President Biden approved the sale of long-sought F-16s, and agreed that Washington will refer to the country as Türkiye. Turkey’s parliament, often unfriendly toward the West, will consider the Sweden decision in October.

Biden deserves some credit for holding the alliance together on the Finland-Sweden accessions — an easy sell except for Turkey — and on NATO’s continued arming of Ukraine, though several members consistently have led Washington in supporting advanced weapons for Ukraine.  

Ironically, the positions were reversed on Biden’s decision to give Ukraine cluster munitions, which would have been unnecessary had Washington earlier provided the urgently needed tanks, missiles, air defenses and aircraft.

Sweden’s joining, and the renewed commitment to Ukraine, were the summit’s good news. The not-so-good news was NATO’s refusal, instigated by fearful U.S. leadership, to guarantee membership to the only European country bearing the brunt of the Russian aggression NATO was created to deter and defeat.

As NATO’s most important contributor, Washington naturally has the biggest say in its decisionmaking, but Biden also harbors the greatest fears of Vladimir Putin’s potential escalation — “that’s World War III.”

For Ukraine, tragically, it is a combination of déjà vu and catch-22.

Ukraine gave up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons in 1994 in exchange for security guarantees from Washington, London and Moscow under Boris Yeltsin. In 1997, NATO and Ukraine deepened their security relationship.

At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, then-President Bush persuaded NATO to reaffirm the 1994 and 1997 security commitments and declare that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.” But, again without a set schedule, Georgians and others complained of “NATO fatigue.” Worse, NATO statements without a security guarantee, far from deterring Putin’s Russia, were effectively putting a target on their back.

Sure enough, in August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia. The United States and NATO condemned the aggression but did nothing to stop or reverse it.

Unpunished for its Georgia aggression, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, annexing Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. America and NATO called the actions “illegal and illegitimate” and Russia was expelled from the Group of Eight. Barack Obama, then president, assigned Vice President Biden as his chief envoy for Ukraine.

The Obama-Biden administration instituted a policy of sending only non-lethal aid to Ukraine for fear of provoking Putin. In December 2017, then-President Trump broke with the policy and began sending some long-requested lethal weapons, though the process became embroiled in domestic U.S. and Ukrainian politics.

In 2019, Ukraine passed a constitutional amendment committing to become a member of NATO and the European Union. That September, Ukraine’s new president, Volodymyr Zelensky, approved Ukraine’s National Security Strategy providing for partnership with NATO, with the aim of gaining membership.

Russia’s military buildup along Ukraine's borders in 2021 and early 2022 — the largest since 2014 — raised alarms in the West, but the Biden administration only promised future economic sanctions.

Having met with Biden in June 2021, Putin published an article in July questioning the legitimacy of Ukraine’s borders Moscow had guaranteed in 1994. He asserted that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” threatened by Western interference.

NATO needs to rectify its deterrent policies that have led to the largest land war in Europe since Hitler’s armies ravaged the continent. The current approach enables Ukraine to defend the still unconquered majority of its territory and to try to push Russian forces out of the occupied parts of the rest. But it is a policy of survival, not liberation, and has failed to convince Putin of the futility of his ambition to incorporate much or all of Ukraine into a reconstructed Russian empire.

U.S. and Western inhibitions against provoking Putin have kept alive his expectation that his authoritarian will and threats of escalation will ultimately erode the West’s resolve. Putin is not convinced by Biden’s repeated protestations that America’s and NATO’s commitment to Ukraine is “ironclad.” As for the U.S.-NATO pledge of no decisions or even discussions “about Ukraine without Ukraine,” Zelensky’s exclusion from last week’s critical pre-summit deliberation probably cheered the beleaguered Putin.

That is what motivates Ukraine’s heroic president to press for “early” NATO membership — more than 15 years and two Russian invasions after NATO first committed to it. But Biden’s fear that Ukraine in NATO would trigger Armageddon prevents it despite the wishes of most NATO members — an ironic shift of positions since it is usually the Europeans who worry that rambunctious Americans will plunge the world into conflict.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin last week said he has “no doubt” Ukraine will join the Alliance “when the war is over,” a NATO posture that incentivizes Putin to keep it going.

To disabuse Putin of false hopes and bridge the transition from war to peace, NATO should establish a no-fly zone over the parts of the country that either have been liberated or were never occupied by Russia: no Russian or Belarussian aircraft allowed, no missiles, no drones over unoccupied Ukraine.

Zelensky urged the allied action even before Russian forces crossed the border. Biden opposed it then for the same reason he opposes Ukraine’s NATO membership now: the exaggerated fear that Putin would escalate the situation into a nuclear war.

But the no-fly zone would not extend over those parts of Ukraine that are still contested and/or Russian occupied — that is, Eastern Ukraine and Crimea — reducing the risk of a U.S.-NATO clash. It would apply only to those areas of the country where Ukraine is exercising full territorial sovereignty under international law. As Ukraine’s forces eject Russia from the contested and/or occupied areas, that liberated territory then would be included within the no-fly zone.

It is time for Washington to shake off the shackles of self-deterrence that helped precipitate this war and allow it to continue. Ukraine, and Western security, deserve victory and peace. Biden should let it happen before isolationist and war-weary forces in Congress vindicate Putin's strategy of dragging the war out.

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA

Three revelations stand out.

First, a former factory employee claimed that Russian depictions of supposed Ukrainian war crimes were staged fakes: “Most of the people who were portrayed in such stories as ‘victims’ of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were stand-ins, hired individuals,” he said. (All translations are mine.) “These characters repeated pre-memorized lines to themselves, trying to ‘squeeze out a tear.’ They were also instructed off-camera by the operator to speak ‘slower’ or to ‘repeat this moment again.’”

Students of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia won’t be surprised by this statement — though some naive Russian apologists who still believe that Ukrainian neo-Nazis are on the rampage might. Russian efforts at disinformation go back a long way and became standard operating procedure for the various versions of the Soviet/Russian secret police.

Prigozhin’s manipulation of the media — obviously approved by Vladimir Putin — is thus nothing new. The willingness of “useful idiots” in both the West and the Global South to believe such propaganda is also nothing new. One can but glumly conclude that facts have only a marginal influence on people’s worldviews — though that, too, is nothing new.

Second, and no less disturbing, Russians appear to see no difference between trolling and actual journalism, as the following statement suggests: “The head of the St. Petersburg branch of the Union of Journalists of Russia, Dmitry Sherikh, volunteered to help the employees of the ‘troll factory’ with finding work: ‘The UJR will, if possible, contact the heads of other media outlets to help their dismissed colleagues find employment, as well as provide other information support.’”

Propagandists and liars are not “colleagues” and should have no place in normal journalism, which attempts to report on genuine news. Not so, evidently, in Putin’s Russia, where George Orwell’s nightmarish vision in “1984” has taken root and the distinction between truthfulness and mendacity has broken down. It will take years for Russians to learn of the difference, even if Putin departs this world tomorrow.

Third, and possibly most disturbing, most of the trolls appear to have been regular folk and not wild-eyed Putin supporters. Apparently, the atmosphere in the troll factories was “nerve-wracking,” with “terrible ideological pressure” that made the office resemble a “military enterprise.”

Despite the seemingly intolerable working conditions and the requirement that the trolls lie, “the majority of people” in the factories were without ideological leanings and uninterested in politics. Here’s the kicker: the trolls were “often” people who “supported the opposition or opposed the war in Ukraine.”

Unsurprisingly, “people were just producing texts” — that is, they knew full well that they were lying. But they were happy to sacrifice whatever ethical norms they might have had to make a quick buck. Shed a tear when you read that the collapse of Prigozhin’s troll factories has “become a disaster for many, because they need to look for a new job, to worry.”

As these worried trolls look for new jobs, ordinary Russians should consider just what their own inability to tell the truth from lies, as well as their blissful indifference to that inability, says about them and their political culture. They should also consider just how long the line of defendants at the International Criminal Court will have to be for their culture to be redeemed.

Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.”

This month also marks the tenth anniversary of another monumental achievement in democracy’s march:  when thirty million people took to the streets of Egypt to demand an end to autocracy and corruption.  

Yet unlike the handful of visionary leaders that gathered in Philadelphia, Egypt’s thirty million courageous democrats have largely been erased from collective memory and their message ignored.   

Commentary on this tenth anniversary has been dominated by two narratives, neither of them fully accurate. Those sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam — including those tied to the Gulf monarchies that claim legitimacy through religion — decry the Egyptian military’s overthrow of the first elected president in Egyptian history.  Those friendly to General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's regime in Egypt point out the authoritarian and anti-democratic tendencies of the Muslim Brotherhood when it gained power. They paint Sisi as a national savior.   

Unless we cut through these narratives, we will never hear the wise and beautiful message that the Egyptian people tried to deliver.  That message is important, because it could very literally transform the world into one that is much freer, safer, and more prosperous.   

The two narratives about events of June and July 2013, like almost every controversy within the Arab world, start from the false premise that only two political forces exist: secular authoritarianism and political Islamism. The despots’ apologists insist that only their strong hands can save us from the ravages of Islamic extremism. Both sides pretend that nobody in the region favors the secular democratic ideals we hold dear because those ideals pose a mortal threat both to autocracy and to political Islam.  

The 2011 revolution against Egypt’s repressive dictator, Hosni Mubarak, brought together a wide swath of Egyptian society:  students, trade unionists, secular democrats, adherents of Gamal Abdul Nasser or Anwar el-Sadat, and an eclectic range of Islamist groups. When the people forced Mubarak from power, the military stepped in and promised to oversee a transition to democratic rule.   

This military government, like Mubarak before it, sought western support by warning of the dangers of political Islam. Domestically, however, it aligned itself with the Muslim Brotherhood to target repression upon the real threat: secular democrats. When it held a presidential election, it excluded all credible secular democratic candidates, allowing only a choice between generals, supporters of generals, and Islamists. Given that unattractive choice, voters narrowly chose the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi.   

Rather than work with secular democrats to consolidate Egyptian democracy, the Brotherhood foolishly tried to entrench its own dominance in government.  It manipulated voter lists, tried to skew elections for the upper house of parliament, and assaulted and arrested pro-democracy demonstrators. All this wildly overplayed the limited mandate it received in an election that was far from free or fair.  

After a year, the Egyptian people had had enough.  Thirty million took to the streets across the country, demanding that Morsi and the Brotherhood step down and agree to genuinely open, free elections. This was surely one of the largest public demonstrations on any issue anywhere in the history of humanity. It was everything we are told the Arab street is not:  peaceful, secular, and pro-democratic. 

A peaceful uprising by more than thirty million people in deeply religious Egypt against political Islam could have and should have rendered that movement untenable. If the Egyptian people could establish a secular democracy, both despots and Islamists throughout the region would be fatally undermined.   

Yet what ought to have been one of democracy’s shining moments in world history was quickly thwarted when General Sisi exploited the popular anger to lead a military coup against Morsi. 

The U.S. did not acquit itself well. Instead of supporting and amplifying the Egyptian people’s demands for true democracy, unshackled by religion or authoritarianism, we vacillated. We first promised Morsi that we would support his mandate and then acquiesced quickly in Sisi’s takeover. We made little effort to press Sisi to hold free elections and scarcely noticed his massacres of thousands of peaceful men, women, and children demonstrating for democracy, or his mass round-ups and torture of secular democratic opponents.   

Today’s Egypt is wasting its enormous democratic and economic potential.  Sisi seems determined to rule for life. All signs of dissent are being crushed, and he has even sought to aid Russia’s barbarous invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, corruption, mismanagement, and the Sisi’s vanity projects have brought the economy to its knees.   

The Egyptian people deserve better. They have earned better. We should stop propping up Sisi. We should make all aid condi­tional on the freeing of dissidents, the restoration of a free press, and genuinely open elections in which secular democrats may run.

The Egyptian people may still set an example for the world, if we let them.  

David A. Super is a professor at Georgetown Law. 

The president stopped in London on his way to the NATO Summit in Vilnius, joining Sunak but also having an audience with King Charles III, the newly coronated monarch. The visit, and recent bilateral announcements, were remarkable not for any significant policy changes or developments. Instead, they were rather measured and yeoman-like, reflecting current realities — and that makes them of far greater value to both countries than lofty rhetoric.  

By any measure, the relationship now is far stronger than it has been in recent years at the political level. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union in 2016 left a sour taste in Washington. The resulting post-Brexit political turmoil within the Conservative Party and, consequently, in 10 Downing Street, made American policymakers wary of leaning too far forward into the relationship. 

While the bar was admittedly low after Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s tenure, Sunak has breathed new life into the political relationship, even if it was viewed — erroneously — as being met with slightly chillier feelings early on. Sunak’s managerial assertion of grip is providing a renewed sense of constancy and, it is hoped, continuity, at least for the time being.  

It is important also to note that the practical relationship between the intelligence communities of both countries and the military-to-military partnership has remained and will remain unchanged, barring any dramatic shifts in American politics which, sadly, could well be on the horizon. A return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office, a distinct possibility, could strain the relationship not just at the political level but at a practical level, as well.  

In the near term, certainly, through the end of the Biden presidency and Sunak tenure, the auguries for the relationship with the United Kingdom are strong, which is a good thing given the litany of challenges both are facing in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. The recognition of these challenges and a shared vision for addressing them via sensible policy is underpinning and informing the bilateral relationship and should be welcomed.  

Russia’s war against Ukraine created an opportunity for the United Kingdom to reassert its role in continental security. While it has long supported Ukraine through Operational Orbital, the Ministry of Defence was one of the earliest and strongest supporters of Kyiv, a role it has maintained throughout the nearly 18 months of war. London is the second-largest financial supporter of Kyiv providing over $6 billion in military assistance through the end of May 2023. Washington and London, however, disagree over the pathway for Ukraine’s entry into NATO, agreeing in principle that it should happen but not about how the process will accommodate Kyiv. The U.K. also disagrees with America’s decision to send Ukraine dual-purpose improved conventional munitions, also known as “cluster bombs.”  

Ultimately, although it is no longer in the European Union, the United States needs a strong United Kingdom working with Europe to ensure continental security and stability by, through and with NATO. Indeed, Washington will be watching to see what the now-delayed Defence Command Paper says about London’s military intentions and to see whether the Treasury will be able to match the Ministry of Defence’s ambitions with commensurate resources. A stronger London will only help Washington’s desire to pivot towards the Indo-Pacific, a move matched by the U.K.’s tilt toward the region. It is here that developments are equally as positive, most recently via the Atlantic Declaration, unveiled in June during Sunak’s visit to Washington.  

A series of broad policy initiatives and principles that seek to strengthen the bilateral economic ties between Washington and London, the declaration first and foremost, recognizes the shift of the geopolitical center of gravity to the Indo-Pacific. It also recognizes the complexity of the challenge that China represents beyond the presentation of a military threat. Beijing’s efforts to dominate next-generation technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and synthetic biology (among others) require closer cooperation between allies such as the U.S. and U.K.

The Atlantic Declaration’s focus on information-sharing, joint technology development, reduction of export controls and standardization of date regimes is all a recognition of the need to remove barriers to this cooperation within the Anglosphere.  

Most emblematic of the changing cooperation dynamic, and the new geopolitical realities, is the AUKUS accord. While most attention focused on the submarine component of the agreement between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. it is the second pillar of nuclear technology and information-sharing that marks a sea-change in America’s approach to relations in the Anglosphere. If executed properly and fully, information-sharing and joint industrial policy will markedly strengthen and deepen the bilateral relationship, positioning for strategic competition and beyond.  

The Atlantic Declaration reflects the administration’s growing recognition that in order to be successful in competing with Beijing, it must empower its allies, including the U.K. The United States has neither the power nor the will to act alone in the Indo-Pacific or on all fronts of this complex competitive landscape. Ceding some leadership initiative to London is a way of both empowering London and leveraging allied dynamism.

The forthcoming summit on artificial intelligence scheduled for this autumn will see the U.K. in the driver’s seat of a critical issue. It will certainly benefit 10 Downing Street, leveraging the U.K.’s growing role in AI, but it also provides a venue for allied nations to cooperate in the face of the behemoth that is China in this critical technology.  

The devil is, as always, in the details. Both Washington and London must do their parts at home to resource commitments to defense and security and operationalize AUKUS and the declaration. While a free trade agreement (promised by the Conservative Party) would be welcome, it is a far more complex proposition to secure. It should, however, not stand in the way of practical policies to address real and pressing challenges. 

Here, both the White House and 10 Downing Street are taking smart steps to strengthen the relationship and move beyond simple talking points and cliches about the “special relationship.”  

Joshua C. Huminski is the director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress. He is also a book reviewer for the Diplomatic Courier and a fellow at George Mason University’s National Security Institute. He can be found on Twitter at @joshuachuminski. 

More threatening because the possibility of a tactical nuclear missile either being deliberately or accidentally launched grows by the day. Should that occur, the potential for an all-out nuclear conflict grows with it.

To those who think that's an exaggeration, review the events that led up to World War I. Seemingly unconnected tripwires ultimately lit the fuse for “The Great War,” resulting in 20 million men, women and children dying. 

The war between Russia and Ukraine is littered with such seemingly unconnected tripwires. One new tripwire was President Biden’s shocking decision last week to approve the transfer of cluster bombs to Ukraine — bombs that are banned by more than 100 countries, including 18 members of NATO. They are banned because they kill civilians and children long after they have fallen. 

More than 40 human rights organizations — as well as several Democratic lawmakers — have condemned the transfer of these banned weapons to Ukraine. “The decision by the Biden administration to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine is unnecessary and a terrible mistake,” said Rep. Betty McCollum (D-Minn.), the ranking member of the House’s defense appropriations subcommittee. “The legacy of cluster bombs is misery, death and expensive cleanup generations after their use.”

And yet, here we are. A tripwire laid and an escalation that will most certainly harden Russian resolve. 

To that point, just this past week, Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president and current deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, said: “World War Three is getting closer.” 

Some may argue, “Who cares what Medvedev says? He’s an ally of the evil Putin.”

Okay. Let’s switch to the other side.

Also last week, while at the NATO summit in Lithuania, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky admitted that it was “logical” that some NATO leaders fear sparking World War III by admitting his country while it’s at war with Russia.

As these tripwires become more exposed — and as Russian leaders openly threaten London with a nuclear strike — here in the U.S. it all seems to be “ho, hum,” as we focus on a boycott of Bud Light, Hunter Biden’s questionable lifestyle and connections, or the pending takeover of the world by AI.

Newsflash: None of those things will ever matter again if a tactical nuclear missile is launched which then initiates a retaliatory response.

We have never been closer to the potential annihilation of tens of millions of human beings — and almost no one seems to care.

One reason being that almost every entity in the Western world — be it the U.S. government; the vast majority of our media; the vast majority of academia; as well as our allies, their media, their academia; and celebrities the world over — is on “Team Ukraine.”

That, of course, being the correct decision.

That said, one can still strongly oppose Putin and Russia's invasion of Ukraine and question United States policy as it relates to that war. Or can one?

Not only is it rare to find articles, columns or televised news hits questioning the blanket U.S. support of Ukraine, but if one is found, someone in the comments sections or the Twitter-verse will label those making such arguments “Putin Lovers,” “Russia Lovers” or even “Traitors.”

I would certainly argue that questioning our policy as it pertains to the war between Ukraine and Russia is one of the most “pro-American” actions one could take. It is our responsibility and duty to ask such questions. 

To be sure, Ukraine and Zelensky are in the fight of their lives against Russia. Spinning any and every situation to their advantage is part of their job description. That said, it is incumbent upon the American government — and hopefully our professional media — to separate fact from fiction and then act or report accordingly.

Neither our government nor our media should act as fawning, unquestioning cheerleaders for Zelensky and his policies. Most especially as those policies — and spins — can have a direct negative impact upon the welfare of the American people.

One of the most important questions seemingly not allowed to be asked, or which gets ignored if it is asked, is: “Are the allies supporting Ukraine on a quest to save the Ukrainian people, or are the ‘leaders’ of those countries in reality using them as cheap and disposable pawns in order to fight a proxy war against Russia while testing some of the latest weapons systems, depleting their own military supplies and reaping billions in profit for defense contractors?”

If it’s because we want to save the lives of the people of Ukraine and salvage their infrastructure, then we are failing miserably.

With regard to questions being frowned upon or outright censored as they relate to U.S. involvement in Ukraine — possible corruption in Ukraine, the tracking of hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars going into Ukraine or the increasing demands of Zelensky — a report out this week from the House Judiciary Committee’s Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government is headlined: “The FBI’s collaboration with a compromised Ukrainian intelligence agency to censor American speech.” 

The report says the Ukrainian intelligence service SBU sent the FBI lists of social media accounts that allegedly “spread Russian disinformation,” and that the FBI then “routinely relayed these lists to the relevant social media platforms, which distributed the information internally to their employees in charge of content moderation and enforcement.” The committee further alleged that the FBI and SBU “flagged for social media companies the authentic accounts of Americans, including a verified U.S. State Department account and those belonging to American journalists” as well as requested that those accounts be taken down.

As Americans, we should be free to debate the level of U.S. involvement in Ukraine in a civil and productive manner. That acknowledged, I suspect most Americans on either side of that debate would be in total agreement that the intelligence service of Ukraine should not be dictating what Americans are allowed or not allowed to say on social media.

Douglas MacKinnon, a political and communications consultant, was a writer in the White House for Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, and former special assistant for policy and communications at the Pentagon during the last three years of the Bush administration.

First, the good news: Two and half years after entering office, the Biden administration has finally appointed a senior official to focus on advancing the Abraham Accords — the series of landmark deals normalizing relations between Israel and four Arab states that former President Donald Trump brokered in late 2020. The official, Daniel Shapiro, is a well-regarded diplomat and Middle East expert who served as President Barack Obama’s ambassador to Israel.

The not-so-good news? Rather than elevating Shapiro as President Joe Biden’s special envoy, as many in Congress are seeking to do, the administration instead buried Shapiro in the bureaucracy. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced the appointment via tweet (it apparently didn’t even merit a formal press release). The tweet doesn’t explicitly outline the chain of command, but a press conference that day by a spokesperson made it clear that Shapiro will not report directly to Biden or even to Blinken, but rather to the assistant secretary of state responsible for Middle East affairs — one of the State Department’s six regional bureaus. 

That’s a far cry from the fully empowered envoy that Congress has been pushing for. In legislation passed last month by an overwhelming bipartisan majority, the U.S. House of Representatives authorized the creation of a special envoy at the State Department who would be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, report directly to the Secretary of State and be charged with coordinating across the entire U.S. government on issues related to expanding and strengthening the Abraham Accords. 

None of those outward markings of bureaucratic heft appear to apply to Shapiro’s job as senior advisor for regional integration. That’s a shame. Not so much because it will prevent Shapiro from making an important contribution. He’s a talented diplomat with deep experience in both Israel and the Arab world. He has strong personal relationships with Biden, Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan from their years together in the Obama administration. But his subordinate status in the bureaucratic pecking order will almost certainly make his job more difficult than it otherwise might have been.  

It’s also something of a missed opportunity for Biden. There have been lingering doubts about his willingness to invest in what after all was the crowning diplomatic success of his predecessor. Indeed, during Biden’s first months in office, he and his team seemed to go out of their way to squander the diplomatic momentum that Trump bequeathed them. Senior Biden aides called into question the political and military commitments Trump made to underwrite the accords. They pursued a campaign that seemed tailor-made to antagonize the Arab world’s most influential state, Saudi Arabia. And don’t forget the absurd lengths that Biden’s State Department spokesperson went to in the spring of 2021 to avoid even saying the words “Abraham Accords.” 

Granted, the administration has made important strides to make up for its early missteps. It established the I2U2 process, a new framework for economic projects that brings India together with Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. In early 2022, the administration helped birth the Negev Forum — a series of ministerial meetings and multilateral working groups where Israel and several of its peace partners hope to tackle pressing common challenges in areas from health care to water to food security. And after several fits and starts, the administration has finally shown signs of getting serious about stabilizing its relations with Saudi Arabia and forging peace between Riyadh and Jerusalem.  

Appointing a presidential envoy for the Abraham Accords would have been an important opportunity for Biden to showcase his commitment to build on Trump’s most important diplomatic achievement and lay to rest questions that remain about the priority he places on advancing Arab-Israeli peace. That’s why it was one of the top recommendations we made in a report for the Jewish Institute for National Security of America in January 2022. A presidential envoy would have established a focal point within the U.S. government dedicated to coordinating the wide-ranging activities of multiple agencies involved in the political, economic and security aspects of normalization. It would also have provided an authoritative address in Washington where all those interested in making peace with Israel could go with confidence that they were speaking to someone with the ear of the president and his most senior aides. 

There’s still a real chance that Congress could force Biden’s hand on the special envoy position. After Shapiro’s appointment, Senate staff told us that there is bipartisan support in the Senate for legislation like the bill passed by the House. That would have the unfortunate consequence of reinforcing the narrative that Biden’s support for the Abraham Accords has been halfhearted at best and that he’s had to be dragged into taking the necessary measures to seize today’s historic opportunity for Middle East peacemaking.  

Ambassador Shapiro is the right man for the job. Now Biden needs to ensure that the job is one that he’s set up for maximum success.  

John Hannah is Randi and Charles Wax Senior Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America. He served as a national security adviser to U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney. Morgan Viña is vice president of government affairs at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America. She previously served as chief of staff to U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Nikki R. Haley.

The deal, to date, has facilitated the export of enough food to feed nearly 150 million people for a year, and its expiration would likely exacerbate an already severe global food crisis. While the international community should continue to exert pressure on Russia to extend the agreement, it should also use this as an opportunity to reinvigorate efforts to increase the resilience of food supply chains.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered a global food security crisis. Ukraine had historically been one of the world’s largest grain exporters, but the country’s grain production and exports plummeted following the Russian invasion. This contributed to a spike in global food prices and heightened levels of food insecurity in much of the world.

The UN-brokered grain deal — agreed to by Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and the UN in July 2022 — was an important step in addressing the crisis. The deal sought to mitigate the war’s impact on global food security by establishing a maritime humanitarian corridor as well as a registration and inspection scheme to facilitate the export of grain, related foodstuffs and fertilizers from three key Ukrainian ports. Despite the global humanitarian impact, Russia has declared in recent weeks that there are “no grounds” to extend the agreement past July 18.

As important as it is that the grain deal be continued, it is also important for countries to use this as an opportunity to future-proof their food supply chains against the litany of other challenges they face.

The Ukraine war and the food crisis that it has fueled is just one example of how vulnerable global food systems are to disruption. To ensure countries have access to affordable staple foods long after the Ukraine conflict ends, governments should take concerted action to increase the resilience of their food supply chains. Food systems are vast and complex, and improvement is needed broadly, but here are three key steps that can be taken now to achieve concrete results across the food supply chain.

First, countries should take steps to reduce food loss and waste. A staggering 40 percent of all food is lost or wasted across the global food supply chain, which equates to approximately $1 trillion per year. If just 5 percent of that food loss and waste is prevented, an additional 40-160 million people could be fed, which would offset the loss of the grain deal.

One way countries can achieve that goal is by adopting food harvesting and storage strategies that reduce the risk of food being mishandled, left to spoil or made vulnerable to theft. Furthermore, those with the resources to do so can implement monitoring systems that utilize remote sensors to monitor temperature, moisture levels and other conditions that contribute to spoilage, as well as to detect and prevent theft.

Second, countries should strive to increase efficiency and flexibility in their food supply chains by investing in transportation and logistics infrastructure. Public investments in national road networks have been shown to enable more efficient food transportation and reduce costs to consumers. Additionally, countries can minimize the impact of climate change on their ports and other trade-related infrastructure by investing and adapting in mitigating measures, for example by elevating or protecting ports.

Finally, countries should seek to accelerate food supply chains by leveraging digitization, automation and data. Digitizing trade processes can reduce supply chain bottlenecks and reduce operational costs, thereby accelerating trade.

In developing countries, this can be accomplished through accelerated adoption of electronic trade documents, such as bills of lading, in place of cumbersome paper documents. Relatedly, automation and data can be leveraged to better coordinate food imports and exports and enhance existing decision-making processes.

In the U.S., public initiatives such as the Maritime Transportation Data System could create a framework for enhanced visibility of cargo (which has been the standard in airlines and basic delivery logistics for decades) and should be implemented as quickly as possible. Implementing other public and private programs would enable even more advanced solutions to further enhance supply chain resiliency. These initiatives will also help drive standards and accelerate digitization globally.

Regardless of whether the grain deal is extended, its possible collapse — and the severe consequences this could have for global food security — should serve as a wake-up call. The global food supply chains upon which much of the world relies are highly vulnerable to disruption. While investments across the food systems are needed to improve long-term, global food security, attainable actions to improve the supply chains can at least help ensure that access to affordable, staple foods is shielded from the effects of whatever disruptions lay ahead.

Rob Rosenberg is president and CEO of NTELX, Inc. and a nonresident fellow at The Stimson Center, a nonpartisan research center located in Washington, D.C.

There is also an important geopolitical consideration at play: Namely, Japan is now being viewed as an alternative investment outlet to China, as multinational companies diversify their supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and heightened tensions between the U.S. and China. For example, seven of the world’s largest semiconductor makers have made plans to increase manufacturing and deepen tech partnerships in Japan according to the Financial Times. 

Still, most economists are skeptical that the Japanese government can revive the country’s dynamism in the 1970s and 1980s when it rivaled the U.S. economy. Japan’s economy has languished since the bursting of the stock market and real estate bubble in the early 1990s, and it has struggled with deflation for the past three decades. In the meantime, the economy’s potential real GDP growth has slowed to 1 percent per annum as the labor force has shrunk over time.

Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida launched his “new capitalism” initiative one year ago with the goal of boosting economic growth and lessening income inequality. The essence of the concept is to produce a “virtuous cycle of growth and distribution” in which faster economic growth supports social goals through higher wages and household tax deductions.  

When the idea was floated in early 2022, it was greeted with skepticism by many observers. One critique was that the attempt to enforce Japan’s equal pay for equal work laws by offering public sector workers a one-time raise and pressuring private companies to do the same was not new. It had been tried by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to little avail. Furthermore, the Kishida administration is resisting dealing with Japan’s chronic labor shortage by allowing more foreign workers into the country.   

A more basic criticism by The Economist is that the rhetoric of the new capitalism represents a misdiagnosis of Japan’s economic ills: “It has barely budged since the 1990s. Growing inequality is less of a problem than a lack of dynamism.” 

In response to these and other criticisms, Kishida offered more specifics about his economic action plan in a recent speech. He stated that his economic strategy will focus on investment in human resources, science and technology, innovation and startups. Among other initiatives, the government is targeting spending on green and digital transformations to serve as catalysts for private-sector investment. 

So, what are the main obstacles Japan faces in achieving economic success? 

Economist Robert Feldman of Morgan Stanley offers his take in a report titled, “Japan’s New Grand Strategy.” He sees Japan's economic strategy as emerging but also believes that achieving its aspirations will require enhanced capabilities in four key areas: a faster rate of technology adoption, the need for enhanced labor market mobility that will require retraining and reallocating the labor force, better corporate and national governance to improve economic efficiency, and the need for fiscal rebalancing to reduce costs in traditional areas and via pension reform with the goal of stabilizing Japan’s debt/GDP ratio. 

While it is too early to assess progress in these areas, Morgan Stanley’s economists are optimistic about the country’s economic prospects because the threat of deflation has lessened. In a recent report, they observe there has been a momentous shift in Japan’s growth of nominal GDP. They are forecasting that Japan’s nominal growth trend will shift up above 2 percent over the medium term after temporarily surging to nearly 5 percent this year due to higher inflation. They see benefits from higher nominal growth in terms of increased wages for workers and higher tax revenues for the government. In their view, these developments would help to sustain further increases in Japan’s stock market. 

My own take is that international investors need to take a closer look at corporate governance in Japan. Hiromi Yamaji, the new head of the Japan Exchange Group, has stated that companies should implement Japan’s Corporate Governance Code by looking more carefully at their price-to-book ratios, capital costs and share price, while also engaging in a “constructive dialogue” with shareholders. Accordingly, some investors are hopeful that stricter enforcement of governance standards will be positive for shareholders.

Yet, the Financial Times observes that Kishida’s own philosophy of corporate governance is less shareholder friendly. Whereas Prime Minister Abe began his term by promising more shareholder-friendly governance, the word “reform” is virtually absent from Kishida’s vocabulary. Moreover, there is still strong opposition among Japanese companies to laying off workers when profits plummet. In this respect, Japan’s “new capitalism” still seems a far cry from its U.S. counterpart.

Nicholas Sargen, Ph.D., is an economic consultant for Fort Washington Investment Advisors and is affiliated with the University of Virginia’s Darden School of Business. He has authored three books including Global Shocks: An Investment Guide for Turbulent Markets.

Zelensky had hoped for an announcement that Ukraine would soon join NATO. Instead, he received assurances that his country was on something of a fast track to entry; that NATO would continue to support Ukraine with both weapons and economic assistance during the war with Russia and after it comes to an end; and that the alliance would create a new NATO-Ukraine Council, which would nominally put Kyiv on an equal footing with its counterparts in the alliance.

Zelensky initially responded badly to what NATO offered, but subsequently walked back his more egregious assertions that demeaned the alliance’s offer. He acknowledged that it would be senseless for NATO to commit itself to the direct defense of Ukraine in the midst of the Russo-Ukrainian war, which could trigger an outright conflict between Russia and the Alliance.

Zelensky’s sense of urgency, however, is understandable. As a war leader, he must press for every advantage he could possibly achieve. After all, Winston Churchill acted no differently when urgently seeking maximum levels of American assistance before the U.S. entered World War II.

Moreover, Zelensky’s pressure for early entry into NATO no doubt also stems from the possibility that President Joe Biden will not return to the White House in January 2024; indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin is known to hope for exactly that outcome.

Nevertheless, given NATO’s reluctance to change its procedures — which involve ratification by the parliaments of each of its members — Zelensky certainly accomplished much during the summit.

On its face, so did Sweden. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan dropped his objections to Swedish entry into the Alliance. Yet the required parliamentary vote to ratify Swedish entry to NATO is far from guaranteed, and Turkey’s parliament will not even take up the issue until October, when it returns from its summer recess. Erdoğan has demanded that Sweden both extradite Kurds that he claims are members of the outlawed PKK terrorist organization and lift its arms embargo against Turkey. And, in a last-minute addition to his wish list, he has pressed for Turkey’s speedy entry into the European Union.

By the time the summit commenced, Sweden had already altered its constitution, agreed to extradite several suspected PKK members and toughened its anti-terrorism laws. It also agreed to lift its arms embargo on Turkey. Finally, Sweden promised to press for Turkish entry to the European Union. For its part, the EU indicated that it would reconsider Turkey’s application for membership in that organization.

Erdoğan made it clear at the conclusion of the summit that he still expected more from Stockholm. He continued to voice outrage at the Swedish government’s failure to punish anti-Turkish protesters who burned the Koran; the most recent of these burnings had taken place only days before the summit. And he insisted that Sweden turn over even more Kurdish residents for prosecution in Turkey.

Erdoğan also had reason to be skeptical about the European Union’s promise to review Turkey’s bid for accession. Turkey first applied for membership in what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1987. It signed a customs union agreement in 1995, and the European Union (EU), the successor to the EEC, finally accepted Turkey as a candidate for full membership in 1999.

There has been no real progress on the Turkish application since then, however, due not only to objections from Greece and Cyprus, which joined the EU in 2004, but also from Germany, France and Austria. While Germany and France may drop their objections thanks to Swedish entreaties, Cyprus and Austria, neither of which are NATO members, have less incentive to do so. Greece likely will also continue to object, especially as it has blamed Turkey for military provocations in the Aegean Sea. Should the EU backslide on Turkish entry, Erdoğan could well renege on his commitment to support Swedish accession to NATO.

Erdoğan also seeks to acquire F-16Bs from the United States. The Biden administration has made it clear it supports the sale, and there are indications that Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), who has opposed the sale, may at last be giving in to White House pressure to relent. Yet Menendez, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, faces countervailing pressures from his strong supporters in the Greek, Armenian and Cypriot communities in America, who have honored him for standing up to Turkey. It is therefore not at all clear if the sale will finally go through.

Given these uncertainties, Erdoğan may yet ensure that his parliament does not ratify NATO’s offer. It would not be the first time the parliament has reneged on a Turkish commitment. In early 2003, just prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Turkish parliament shocked the Bush administration by demanding $10 billion as the price for letting the Fourth Infantry Division transit Turkish territory to attack Iraq. The administration refused to pay, and the Division was denied transit rights. Failure to meet at least some of Erdoğan’s demands could well result in a parliamentary reprise of 2003.

Yogi Berra once observed that it “ain’t over till it’s over.” With regard to Swedish entry to NATO, and indeed that of Ukraine, truer words were never spoken.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.

Halevi could not be more correct. That same spirit of zero toleration for enabling — for the bystander's complicity in evil — must also dictate U.S. policy regarding current events in Israel.

I am a retired lieutenant colonel in the IDF's Judge Advocate Generals Corps. I was directly involved in implementation of the Oslo Peace Process and have been engaged in Track Two negotiations between Israel and Palestinians.

And I am very much opposed to the Netanyahu government's judicial “reforms,” a white-washing term if ever created. I am also a dual U.S.-Israel citizen who teaches law in the U.S., and I have spoken widely on U.S. and Israel politics, geo-politics and national security matters.

I am deeply concerned about Israeli democracy and the Israel-U.S. relationship — in particular the historical, financial U.S. commitment to Israel — for two related reasons.

The first has to do with pogroms being committed by Jewish settlers and directed at Palestinians living in the West Bank, which have also resulted in harm to U.S. citizens. These are becoming a daily occurrence, unfortunately, with the proverbial “nod and wink” approval of a complicit government whose condemnations are merely rhetorical.

The second issue is the government's determination to eviscerate Israel's independent judiciary, which is essential to the separation of powers and checks and balances.

These two issues directly clash with American interests, values and norms. They do not reflect the Israel beloved by those of us who believe in a liberal democracy. For these reasons, the decades-long relationship between Israel and the U.S. is in peril like never before.

American concern regarding the current situation has been clearly articulated by President Biden and his entire administration. Whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and members of his coalition fully understand and appreciate these clear voices of concern is an open question. 

It is an open secret in Israel that for Netanyahu, an invitation to the White House is much desired and a form of “litmus test.” By the same token, the recently announced decision that Netanyahu will visit China is intended, one presumes, to signal his anger with Biden. The trip has been roundly criticized by Israeli security officials. Be that as it may, under no condition must Biden extend an invitation to Netanyahu.

However, the issue runs deeper than public and private voices of concern and a potential White House visit. Serious consideration must be given to addressing continued U.S. financial aid to Israel. I do not write this lightly. My recommendation that aid be cut may be understood to be against my self-interest; after all, my family lives in Israel. 

However, this is essential for both the U.S. and Israel. Given the dramatic developments here, there is no more effective mechanism for the U.S. government to directly confront these two issues.

The word “pogrom,” which cuts deep for Jews, is correctly used to describe the actions of the Jewish settlers. I am convinced, based on both my IDF experience and academic research, that the settlers committing the pogroms are terrorists and must be held accountable. As widely reported in the press, this is not happening. That is an anathema to the rule of law.

This failure encourages continued violation of human rights, which the government is tolerating. The number of arrests in direct contrast to the number of participants speaks for itself. This, too, must be of great concern to the U.S. government.

Accordingly, the question of continued U.S. financial support must be directly raised with all deliberate speed. There is no justification for failing to have this conversation. Failure to do so is a violation of Halevi's exhortation and reflects the complicity of the bystander who enables evil.

Amos N. Guiora is professor of law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. He is involved with the Bystander Initiative.

Yet amid this all, we must not forget that it is children — especially those who are growing up alone, in fragile family environments or without adequate care — who suffer the most. It is therefore urgent to focus on providing a new safety net for our youths, leaving no one behind. Moreover, when navigating crises, the significance of having strong relationships and a support system cannot be emphasized enough. As the world they grow up in becomes an even more complex place, it is vital that sources of support are made available for the children and young people who need them most.  

Already over 1 billion children are living in poverty today, deprived of the key resources they need, such as good health, education, housing and nutrition, to become their best selves. Even worse, studies show that over 2.4 billion children, suffering from inequality, exclusion and deprivation, are still in need of adequate social protection.

The polycrisis has only worsened these historic disadvantages that many children continue to face. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic had deprived roughly 10.5 million children of a caregiver by May 2022, leaving those without parental care at greater risk of trauma and deeper vulnerabilities.

Likewise, armed conflicts from Ukraine, Ethiopia and Mali to Somalia and Sudan are not only causing significant casualties and displacements, they are leaving children highly exposed to severe malnutrition, trauma, neglect and abandonment — traits of which may stay with them throughout their lives. In Ukraine alone, more than 17 million people are expected to require humanitarian assistance in 2023, of which nearly a quarter are children. Due to the conflict in Sudan, over 13 million children now require emergency assistance — the highest number ever recorded in the country.

This polycrisis is not confined to acute issues like these alone. The impact of both the climate and the cost-of-living crises is being felt in all corners of the world, the burden of which is being carried primarily by children and young people. In the Horn of Africa, which has faced crippling droughts and flooding due to a changing climate, roughly 7 million children under the age of five remain malnourished and in need of urgent support. Likewise, spurred on by economic insecurity and other factors, children account for 40 percent of the roughly 108 million people forcibly displaced across the world; more than 150,000 unaccompanied children are at the greatest risk of trafficking or abuse.

In response, governments, nonprofit service providers and technical experts must offer urgent protection through strengthened or newly set up safety nets.

To begin with, a truly sustained, integrated and child-centered approach is needed to respond to the polycrisis, providing not only children’s most basic needs but ensuring that every child can become their strongest selves to break the intergenerational cycle of deprivation. This means widening the scope of protection to include social services, which can address the vulnerabilities faced by children holistically — including rapid response to emergencies.

Increasing marginal investments could also have an impactful return for the world’s children. For instance, estimates show that raising investments in social protection, such as universal child benefits, by 1 percent of GDP in middle-income countries could reduce child poverty by at least 20 percent.

Secondly, in addressing the impact of the polycrisis, different expertise and resources need to be pooled through strong partnerships that have children’s best interests as their guiding principles. From institutions providing vital family support programs to those building education, health and psychosocial services in vulnerable regions, all organizations have a key role to play in providing a child-centric response to the emerging polycrisis.

Lastly, child-sensitive social protection should be seen not just as the right thing to do but as a means of expanding human capabilities and productivity, fueling sustained economic growth for the future. As an example, SOS Children’s Villages has worked with local partners in Ethiopia to train young people in green agricultural jobs to help build resilient livelihoods for the future, as part of the government’s Productive Safety Net Programme to support over 7 million of the country’s poorest citizens.

All children, regardless of their situation, deserve a nurturing environment to grow in and the full enjoyment of their rights. We must all do our part to ensure a solid support network and safety nets are in place. This is even more urgent as the emerging polycrisis threatens the progress made in the last few decades.

Establishing strong, integrated and inclusive social safety nets can contribute to the protection of universal rights while reducing the chronic vulnerabilities that children and young people face today. Supporting children and providing them with secure and safe environments to grow, is an investment in our shared and sustainable future.

Dereje Wordofa, DBA, MSC, MBA, is president of international charity SOS Children's Villages. Previously he served as assistant secretary-general and deputy executive director of the United Nations Population Fund; as head of regional policy at Oxfam; and as deputy program director of Save the Children UK.