Unfortunately, Washington’s current defense strategy fails to account for the growing linkages between Iran and China.

To address this, the Biden administration should release a supplemental strategy to the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) that specifically acknowledges greater cooperation between Beijing and Tehran. Updating this policy would better enable U.S. government departments and agencies to address shifting national security challenges.  

As it stands, the National Defense Strategy is too narrow in its characterization of China, isolating the “pacing challenge” it poses (that is, its threat of China overtaking the U.S.) in a separate box from Iran’s designation as a “persistent threat.” The NDS echoes the National Security Strategy, painting China as the only other nation with “both the intent to reshape the international order, and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so.”

Meanwhile, Iran is described in the context of its regionally destabilizing proxy warfare and terrorism, as well as its pursuit of nuclear weapons. But the missing piece is how the two continue to collaborate, and the effect this has on integrated deterrence calculations.

Separating the “pacing challenge” from its linkages to Iran not only ignores how these two nations' bilateral cooperation threatens U.S. economic and global security interests, but also sets a meager precedent for how Washington’s national defense apparatus approaches colluding adversaries. 

Several years of Sino-Iranian economic cooperation, as well as the Chinese-brokered detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, exemplify the need for Washington’s attention. For the last ten years, China has been Iran’s largest trading partner. Advancements such as the 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement and Iran’s recent membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization reflect Tehran’s strategy of looking East for survival under international isolation and pressure.

Beijing has also taken advantage of years of hard-hitting sanctions on Iran, becoming Tehran’s biggest oil consumer in exchange for technological development, intelligence resources, and modernized military hardware that is used to both quell domestic grievances and contribute to cross-border violence.  

The Saudi-Iran detente brokered by China in April further showcases an expanding relationship that drags the “pacing challenge” into the Middle East. While the breakthrough does not automatically equate to China replacing U.S. presence or influence in the region, China’s involvement embodies a short-term pragmatic approach based on opportunism.

In turn, otherwise-isolated Tehran welcomes these avenues for cross-border connection to assert its dominance in the region. A supplemental National Defense Strategy should consider Beijing’s behavior in the Middle East, particularly, its willingness to help restore diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran, which remained frozen for more than seven years.   

The NDS’s shortcomings in directly addressing strategic alliances between America’ adversaries and competitors is also visible in the growing Russia-Iran relationship. Since August of 2022, Iran has provided Russia with hundreds of Shahed-136 suicide drones, unmanned aerial vehicles which Putin has deployed against civilians and infrastructure in his war against Ukraine. In exchange, Russia has offered Iran defense cooperation on missiles and air defense, even going so far as to train Iranian pilots to fly the Sukhoi Su-35, an advanced Russian fighter jet. In February, Putin and Raisi signed a deal to create a drone factory in Russia, and Iranian officials have already toured the country to scope prospective sites.

Moscow and Tehran’s military relationship has even expanded past the bilateral threshold, at times including China as a manufacturer. Just last month, the Treasury Department caught up to these developments, sanctioning Chinese companies that supplied Iran with the components used in drones sold to Russia that directly contributed to Ukrainian casualties.

In addition, China and Russia have covertly discussed providing Iran with a key chemical compound used to power ballistic missiles. Bilaterally and collectively, these collaborative efforts complicate U.S. security interests and demand a National Defense Strategy that keeps up.

Section IV of the NDS prescribes “integrated deterrence” as the method for countering China’s “holistic strategies.” But what the NDS presents as the “holistic” correction to its past shortcomings (e.g., lack of clarity, differing priorities, attempting to deter foreign behavior) fails to include comprehensively examining collaboration among top adversaries.

How can “integrated deterrence” be presented as “holistic” if it fails to truly integrate the reality of countries like Iran teaming up with China to get ahead? To achieve solutions, the NDS needs to look at the whole picture, and that includes addressing Iran’s linkages with China in its calculations.

When it comes to the current “pacing challenge” emanating from Beijing, recent strategic moves in the Middle East suggest the U.S. is already being outpaced. If Washington’s NDS directs Washington to work with partners and allies to deter China, it must also recognize the other parts of that equation. It’s time for the Biden administration to put forth a follow-up strategy for the NDS that specifically addresses growing ties between China and Iran.

This updated strategy should specifically address the growing military relationship between the two countries, specifically Iran’s drone proliferation and China’s financial support of such endeavors.

In addition to OFAC’s recent sanctions against Chinese-based companies that supplied Iran with drone components, an additional strategy for the NDS can specifically address countering Iran’s drone capabilities, accounting for how the regime is malignly using it for its partnerships with both China and Russia.

In addition, this new strategy can address Iran and China’s growing economic relationship and what it could mean for U.S. competition with Beijing. The supplemental strategy should be the first step in driving substantial defense policy that realistically unpacks the ramifications of a growing China-Iran relationship.

Iran and China’s growing relationship is no longer a “what-if,” but a “what-do-we-do-now.” U.S. strategy for Iran cannot be kept in an isolated box, focused exclusively on limiting its nuclear threat capabilities. If the main U.S. priority is to keep up with the current “pacing challenge” of China, then the conversation needs to include Iran.

Arona Baigal and Kiana Alirezaie are researchers on the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.  

President Eisenhower made it a priority to catch up from this setback — just four months later, U.S. engineers sent an even more capable Explorer 1 into orbit. The Eisenhower administration then established NASA, to ensure that the United States would triumph in any future space competition.

Keeping this historic anecdote in mind today, it’s troubling how far we have fallen behind both the Russians and Chinese in terms of hypersonic weapons capabilities. We must get up to speed in responding to this challenge.

While the U.S. is seemingly stuck in the research and testing phase of hypersonic capabilities development (the acquisition “valley of death”), rival powers appear to have already fielded operational systems, which can be exceedingly difficult to defend against because of their high speed and maneuverability.

Among the headlines coming out of the war in Ukraine are Russia’s attacks with Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, which are air-launched and alleged to be able to reach Mach 10 — ten times the speed of sound. Though the Ukrainians have cited examples of U.S. Patriot missiles shooting some down, the U.S. cannot yet offer its own hypersonic weapons to match the threat.

China is reportedly further along than Russia in hypersonic weapon deployment, which not only menaces Taiwan but by extension the United States. Moreover, China flexes its military muscle with the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile and DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, both equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles. In 2021, the Chinese sent a hypersonic weapon into low orbit, ominously foreshadowing potential first-strike capability worldwide.

Why is the U.S. seemingly so far behind? What is the holdup in U.S. fielding operational systems?

It’s not a lack of willingness to commit resources or a failure to appreciate the need for advanced weapons systems. In fact, we’ve seen a record-setting $842 billion Defense budget request for fiscal 2024, $11 billion of which is allotted for research, development, testing and evaluation of both hypersonic and long-range sub-sonic missiles.

To its credit, the Biden administration invoked the Defense Production Act’s Title III several months ago to “rebuild and expand the nation’s domestic hypersonic industrial base.” It was designed to dovetail with the president’s Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains of February 2021 to ensure our taxpayers are “buying American” as best we can. Moreover, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering has designated “Hypersonics” as one of its 2023 critical technology areas. And Congress has repeatedly, over the last five years, deemed the development of hypersonic capability as a key element of national defense.

The major disconnect between such emphasis and the ability to rapidly field such capability appears to stem from many years of mixed messages from the Department of Defense to the defense industry over the need for independent innovation and an unfocused goal with respect to hypersonic technology. The result is the all-too-common occurrence of DoD funding duplicative programs that do not move the needle geopolitically and still rely on continued annual funding by a Congress that is eager to see small success as a win but unwilling to continue to tolerate schedule delays and testing failures.

A prime example is the latest Air Force project Mayhem, a $334 million hypersonic weapons program in the middle of an identity crisis. Recent open-source reporting points to the development of a missile; however, digital renderings depict the possibility of a future airplane. It’s another questionable approach that will most likely be terminated like the many other hypersonic programs, such as the U.S. Air Force Air Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), or take an expensive circuitous route to becoming an overpriced drone. The lack of clarity and commitment to innovation beyond what our peer countries have already achieved will only continue to delay our ability to field our own hypersonic weapons.

At a recent conference of the National Defense Industrial Association, Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado noted in a keynote address that hypersonics is “a technology that was born in America, but is being perfected by China and Russia.”

The current unfocused “fund everything and hope that something sticks” approach toward developing hypersonic capabilities is not fielding systems in a timely manner. This has resulted in a limited number of suppliers and limited production capacity along with a manufacturing, materials and testing infrastructure that does not support large scale development and timely fielding.

Complicating matters, the Congressional Budget Office issued a lukewarm review of hypersonics in a January 2023 report, noting “technological challenges must still be overcome” in order to field them. While not unreasonable to conclude at present, we must emphasize the importance of overcoming those challenges in order to match Chinese and Russian technological advances and not fall even further behind.

In sum, the government and the defense industry must cooperate to match resources with requirements. We can’t afford to wait for operational hypersonic systems indefinitely. The need to view the threat posed by Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapons must be treated as a national security threat similar to that posed by a Soviet Sputnika generation ago.

Donald P. Loren is Distinguished Professor of Practice at the National Defense University in Washington D.C. He is a retired U.S. Navy rear admiral, a former deputy assistant secretary of Defense, and former assistant secretary of Veterans Affairs.

The unwavering commitment of the U.S. to Ukraine's sovereignty has been a consistent pillar of American foreign policy. President Biden, in February 2023, reiterated this commitment by declaring that "America will stand firmly beside Ukraine for as long as necessary." However, while the Biden administration has made bold public statements regarding its support for Ukraine, its policy approach reveals a more cautious stance.

Biden has repeatedly emphasized the U.S. willingness to provide Ukraine with the necessary assistance, pledging to do "whatever it takes, as long as it takes." However, the administration's actions have exhibited a degree of caution, a propensity to hold back crucial weapons from Ukraine, deviating from the assertive statements made.

This disparity between rhetoric and policy reflects a nuanced strategy adopted by the Biden administration. Ben Hodges, former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, noted that there is a reluctance to explicitly state that "we want Ukraine to win.” 

It is worth noting that U.S. assistance to Ukraine has not faltered but, in fact, has witnessed substantial growth during Biden's presidency, with an investment of over $40 billion in security assistance since 2021. Furthermore, the American public has displayed unwavering support for this commitment, as reflected in recent polls conducted by the Reagan Institute.

Recent polling by the Reagan Institute from June 2023 reveals a compelling story: A clear majority of Americans — three-quarters, in fact — believe it is important to the United States that Ukraine wins the war against Russia, a sentiment that transcends partisan divisions, with 86 percent of Democrats, 71 percent of Republicans and 58 percent of independents expressing their support.

In general, a significant majority of Americans (59 percent) express their support for providing military aid to Ukraine. This includes 75 percent of Democrats and 50 percent of Republicans, although there is opposition from 41 percent of Republican respondents. The percentage of those who believe the U.S. aid has been valuable once they know that Ukraine aid accounts for 3 percent of the U.S. military's budget, the support jumps even higher, to 64 percent. Among Democrats, 77 percent share this sentiment, while among Republicans, it is 59 percent, and among independents, it is 46 percent. 

At present, the commitment to the Ukrainian cause is driven by multiple factors. Top among these is the conviction that resistance against Russian aggression in Ukraine will discourage Russia from attempting similar incursions in neighboring nations. Protecting freedom and sovereignty, wherever they might be under threat, is another leading reason.

But not everyone supports the provision of aid. Thirty percent of Americans oppose it, predominantly citing domestic needs as a higher priority over foreign aid. Yet, these figures have remained consistent over time from the last polling in November 2022 and are offset by the significant majority in favor of continued aid to Ukraine.

The timing of this news is ideal for Ukraine's leadership, as there is strong bipartisan support to continue in aiding Ukraine's fight as the country’s counteroffensive is underway.

However, it is crucial for Ukraine to remain diligent in its high-stakes counteroffensive and avoid hasty actions. President Volodymyr Zelensky has expressed frustration with the slower-than-desired pace while managing high expectations from the West.

Nevertheless, the Biden administration has faced criticism over its withholding of crucial advanced weapons systems that Ukraine desperately needs, citing concerns about the potential for further escalation. Lawmakers from both major political parties in the United States are intensifying their efforts to persuade the Biden administration to provide Ukraine with controversial long-range munitions.

There is now a coalition of House members, spearheaded by Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colo.), who are exerting increased pressure on the administration. In a letter addressed to President Biden in June 2023, nine lawmakers from both parties urged him to promptly authorize the deployment of ATACMS tactical ballistic missile systems.

Ukraine has persistently requested long-range missiles such as ATACMS, which have a striking range of up to 300 kilometers. These missiles would enable Ukraine to target and neutralize Russian supplies, command posts and other crucial assets deep within enemy territory, severely impairing Russia's combat capabilities. However, there has been hesitation in providing Ukraine with ATACMS, F-16s, and other long-range strike capabilities, as Western allies fear Ukraine might employ them to launch attacks on Russian soil.

 Over the past year, the Biden administration has demonstrated a consistent approach by initially withholding advanced weaponry sought by Ukraine, due to concerns about potential escalation. The pattern goes as such: Russia continues to escalate the war and the U.S. eventually does provide the weapons Ukraine needs, such as the U.S. Abrams tanks. But this is only after Ukraine has lost many lives while waiting for these critical weapons.

However, in response to Ukraine's persistent requests and considering its urgent need for ammunition, Biden has finally made the decision to supply cluster munitions, which Ukraine has been requesting for over a year. 

Unlike Putin, Biden must consider the opinions of his citizens. This creates a political incentive for him to seek a quicker end to the war, especially ahead of the 2024 presidential election. Therefore, with the current support, Biden is empowered to supply Ukraine with the necessary weapons to bring the war to a swift conclusion.

The consensus among Americans remains clear: There is robust support for Ukraine. Public opinion in the U.S. reflects a strong willingness to support Ukraine until victory is achieved, and now U.S. leaders have the backing they need to take decisive measures in assisting Ukraine. President Biden should proceed to provide Ukraine with the much-needed ATACMS and F-16s for its ongoing counter-offensive to win the war.

David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an editor at Euromaidan Press.

But be careful. The use of the word “lessons” can be very misleading. 

So-called lessons drawn from the war in Ukraine may not have universal application except in general terms. Courage, competence, commitment and creativity, for example, have enabled Ukraine to repel the Russian invasion and at least make tactical advances. Yet, each is as old as war.

First, the siren-like call to allow tactical and operational lessons to become surrogates for drawing broader geostrategic and geopolitical conclusions is always present. 

Strategies based on these narrower tactical military lessons invariably fail. To succeed, strategies must be much broader than simply encompassing the military domain.

U.S. strategy in Vietnam, Iraq (twice) and Afghanistan was, in fact, the application of military strategies as substitutes that would not work. Russia’s strategy for Ukraine was a miscast military strategy. Capture Kyiv quickly and Ukraine would surrender. 

Second, many analysts, myself included, drawing on history concluded that “sneak attacks” always tactically succeeded. The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Pearl Harbor in December of that year and North Korea’s invasion of the south in June 1950 were tactical successes that did not end well for the aggressor. The Middle East Wars often began with successful tactical sneak attacks, most famously Israel in June 1967 and Egypt and Syria in October 1973. The Israelis won both. However, Russia’s failed sneak attack gives reason to review this history.

Third, how states learn from wars is critical. Often that does not happen. Preparation for war was something the Ukrainians exploited.  

After Crimea was taken in 2014, a true revolution in military affairs unfolded in Ukraine. From reorganization to imaginative and innovative uses of technology, Ukraine imposed major reforms. One reason was that Ukraine faced a real existential threat that was manifested in 2022 with Russia’s second invasion. Even though thermonuclear war was a threat then and is a threat now, the U.S. and NATO never lost any territory to the Soviet Union and Russia — a fundamental difference from Ukraine’s history.

While the U.S. was able to make major changes in both military strategy and force structure during the Cold War, what is America doing now as it confronts Russia and China and the “no limits” alliance? Regarding China, has the U.S. really moved to offset China’s advantages in geography and missile power? What is the actual strategy if war were to break out against China — and not the rather vague National Defense Strategy that seeks to compete, deter and defeat?  

Regarding Russia, given the huge losses it has taken in its conventional forces, some argue up to losing half its capability, in the future, will it rely more heavily on its numerical advantage in nuclear weapons?

But will the U.S. use this as an opportunity to challenge its strategy at both geopolitical and military levels and its assumptions? If not, could America become a future Russia in the next war if it comes and repeat its history of losing every war it started?  Few have raised this question.

Fourth, here is a thought experiment. Suppose NATO massively intervened with force on Ukraine's side. Clearly, a combination of U.S., British, French and other NATO members’ air and missile dominance, as well as experience in combined operations, would have brought to bear what General Colin Powell initially called “overwhelming force.” Russian forces would have been eviscerated as Iraq's forces were twice in 1991 and 2003.

That is not to argue NATO should directly intervene militarily in Ukraine, which it will not and should not. To make the point, massive military superiority has a quality and quantity of its own. Will the U.S. and NATO do a careful analysis of the military balance with Russia and appreciate where that balance rests?

Finally is the missing dimension in analyses. As Sun Tzu argued in “The Art of War,” the second best strategy is to defeat the enemy’s strategy. How then does one go about doing that? Attack and disrupt the command structure. In this case, Russian incompetence played a large and possibly decisive role in enabling Ukraine’s defenses. 

No one predicted this. Nor did anyone foresee the political chaos caused by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny and its aftermath. This should refocus Western thinking, not on regime change but on disruption. Now that is a lesson worth re-learning.

Harlan Ullman, Ph.D.,  is a senior advisor at Washington, D.C.’s Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” doctrine. His 12th book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD:  How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.

The debt deal negotiated by Congress and signed by President Biden caps defense spending in 2024 at $886 billion for FY 2024, a 3.3 percent increase. The money allocated for 2025, $895 billion, represents an even smaller increase, at only 1 percent over 2024. 

With inflation currently running at around 4.9 percent, these amounts are not enough to keep up with inflation, much less to build a military capable of deterring China from aggression against its neighbors.  

So if spending cannot keep up with inflation, policymakers must at least ensure that every dollar is being spent efficiently. For those in Congress interested in increasing the capability and lethality of the military, the first option they should pursue is to look for savings and efficiencies within the defense budget itself.

Policymakers should start by reducing non-defense spending contained within the defense budget, thus allowing the Department of Defense to better focus its spending on direct military capability.  

Take, for instance, the decades-long decline in weapons and systems procurement as a percentage of the overall defense budget. Although the defense budget should first and foremost fund direct military capability, we have instead prioritized spending on other objectives such as research and development and operations and maintenance. Of course, maintenance costs usually increase as procurement slows. Today, the military is forced to spend more and more on the upkeep of older and older systems.  

Civilian companies such as Delta Airlines and Maersk know this. They choose to replace their planes and ships far sooner than the Air Force or the Navy does, specifically to avoid these rising maintenance costs. The average age of U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft is 32 years, whereas the average age of a Delta Airlines jet is 15.1 years (and even then, Delta gets criticized for its “aging planes”).  

It is time for our military to catch up. To that end, any program that has been in the research phase for more than a few years and shows no sign of transitioning to an acquisition program should be carefully considered for elimination. While we always want our men and women in uniform to have the best equipment, the purpose of research should be to provide military capability, not simply to pursue research for research’s sake. The proposed fiscal 2024 budget contains a whopping $145 billion in research and development funding. Much of that would be better spent buying more planes, munitions, and ships.  

Better still, those billions — in addition to other misaligned funds in the budget — could be put directly toward the American military’s efforts to deter the People’s Republic of China, which the 2022 National Defense Strategy identified as our most “consequential strategic competitor” for the coming decades. For example, the Marine Corps’ Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle program and the CH-47 Chinook helicopter program could both be cut to reallocate funding to lines of effort better suited to conflict in the Indo-Pacific. 

Such reforms could also free up resources to accelerate this budget’s salutary move to multi-year procurement authorities to buy top-priority missiles. Also helpful would be the loosening of rules that currently limit the share of munitions that private companies (as opposed to the government) are allowed to produce for the military.

Policymakers should also consider contracting and management reforms within the Defense Department, such as expanding hiring and firing authorities for civilian employees, updating the federal regulations on commercial item procurement, and cutting bureaucratic red tape would not only yield savings, but lead to an overall more efficient military.

The same can be said for a new round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), which could result in billions more saved annually. According to one official estimate, the savings from previous BRAC rounds amount to roughly $12 billion annually. Nonetheless, in the face of congressional opposition, the Pentagon has given up even asking for permission to start another BRAC round.  

Unfortunately, that’s par for the course in the Biden administration — asleep at the wheel as inflation and government spending continue to spin out of control. But it doesn’t have to be this way. Our government can and should take steps to bring defense spending under control. This is not at odds with having a capable military.

The defense budget deserves the same scrutiny as any other government agency. In fiscal year 2024, defense hawks and fiscal hawks must find common purpose by focusing on improving the existing defense budget. Together, we can move money away from inefficiency and waste and toward increased capability and lethality.

Wilson Beaver is the Senior Policy Analyst for defense budgeting in The Heritage Foundation's Center for National Defense.

Instead of strengthening Zelensky in the eyes of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Kremlin cronies and talking heads, Biden in fact diminished Zelensky. 

In his 2014 book "Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War," former Defense Secretary Robert Gates wrote of then-Vice President Joe Biden, "I think he has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades.” Even former President Barack Obama was reported to have said of Biden, “Don’t underestimate Joe’s ability to f--- things up.”

Sadly, nothing has changed, except that now Biden's decisions have a much broader impact.

In an interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria prior to the Summit, Biden said that Ukraine was “not ready for membership in NATO,” and that it was “premature” to begin the process to allow Ukraine to join the alliance in the middle of a war. He added that he did not “think there is unanimity in NATO about whether or not to bring Ukraine into the NATO family now, and that the process could take place only after a peace agreement with Russia was in place.”

Wittingly or not, he then blindly played into the messaging of the oft-circulated Russian disinformation campaign on social media when referenced what he described as a “lack of democratization” in Kyiv. Biden provided no details or context as to what that meant, nor did he explain why it is presently disqualifying to Ukraine’s eligibility for NATO membership. 

The Kyiv Post reported that, seizing the moment, “top Russian officials accused Kyiv and its allies of bringing humanity closer to World War III and prolonging the war in Ukraine in some eyebrow-raising reactions at the end of the first day of the NATO summit in Vilnius.”

Once again, Washington and Brussels have seemingly succumbed to their own escalation paralysis.

Understandably, Zelensky is not happy with Biden’s comments. He understands the influence that Biden’s words have over the partner nations, and he responded angrily by saying, "It’s unprecedented and absurd when [a] time frame is set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine's membership, while at the same time vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine." 

Zelensky came to Vilnius in pursuit of a much-needed Ukrainian path to admission into NATO, and for respect to bolster Ukrainian morale and fighting spirit. In the end, he got neither. British defense secretary Ben Wallace did not help when he suggested that “Ukraine needs to put more emphasis on thanking the West for its assistance,” and with comments such as, “Whether we like it or not, people want to see a bit of gratitude,” and concerning requests for military equipment, “You know, we’re not Amazon.”

Wallace seemed oblivious to the carnage that Russia had inflicted upon Ukraine and its people for the last 17 months, to say nothing of the beat-down Ukraine had imposed upon the Russian army. 

And it seemed as though National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan was looking for a pat on the back when he said, “The American people do deserve a degree of gratitude from the United States government for their willingness to step up and from the rest of the world as well.”

Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, perhaps mindful of then Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill’s repeated haranguing of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to act faster at the beginning of World War II, was quick to distance himself from his own defense secretary’s comments.

Sunak told reporters that “President Zelensky has expressed his gratitude on a number of occasions, not least in this incredibly moving address he made in parliament. I know he and his people are grateful to the U.K.”

From Zelensky’s perspective, the goal posts appear to be moving. Ukraine may be feeling a bit ill-used as Washington uses its war to pursue broader strategic goals. 

At the onset of Putin's "special military operation," Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin had said, “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”

A spokesperson at the National Security Council followed up Austin’s comments by saying they were consistent with U.S. goals — “to make this invasion a strategic failure for Russia.”  He added, “We want Ukraine to win. One of our goals has been to limit Russia’s ability to do something like this again, as Secretary Austin said. That’s why we are arming the Ukrainians with weapons and equipment to defend themselves from Russian attacks.”

Now that Ukraine has survived what Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley told lawmakers would be the capture of Kyiv within 72 hours, its admission into NATO has lost its urgency. 

Ukraine's weakening of Russia has bolstered NATO’s eastern flank without the loss of a single NATO soldier. That accomplishment, in Zelensky's view, warrants a clear path for his own country into the alliance. But no such path was presented in Vilnius, and Russia is the chief beneficiary.

NATO assistance will continue, of course, including dual-purpose improved conventional munitions to support Ukraine’s battle in the trenches. France agreed to supply Ukraine with 50 Scalp cruise missiles to supplement the British Storm Shadow missile for precision deep strike capability. Germany announced Patriot air-defense missile launchers, Marder infantry fighting vehicles and Leopard tanks. Led by Denmark and the Netherlands, 11 NATO countries agreed to begin an F-16 training program in Europe this August.

But the problem is that more "just enough" military assistance is not going to be enough. 

The leaders of the NATO alliance declared in the summit’s final communique that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO.” But it is not yet clear how Kyiv will ever get there. Biden and NATO fumbled that ball in Vilnius.

Jonathan Sweet, a retired Army Colonel and 30-year military intelligence officer, led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012 to 2014. Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy and is an economist, entrepreneur, and former board member of the World Trade Center, St. Louis. 

With pilfered cryptocurrency, Kim Jong Un’s dynastic regime is racing to build a full spectrum missile and nuclear force with ICBMs, submarine-launched and tactical nukes. After a record launching of over 95 missiles in 2022, and punctuating 2023 by testing a new solid fuel long-range ICBM, the Hwasong-15, which can reach most of the U.S., Pyongyang is making more threatening noises.  

Much has been written about Pyongyang’s seemingly endless nuclear-capable missile tests. But what do they add up to?   

Though little noticed, last month, the DNI’s National Intelligence Council (NIC), declassified a national estimate (NIE) assessing how Kim is likely to leverage his accelerating nuclear and missile capabilities. The NIE says both the best and worst-case scenarios are the least likely: Neither a passive use of nuclear weapons solely for deterrence nor a worst-case use of aggression — including using nuclear weapons — to dominate the Korean Peninsula. 

Unfortunately, that is cold comfort. Why? The intelligence community tells us that over the rest of this decade, Kim is more likely to, ”employ a variety of coercive methods and threats of aggression to try to make progress toward achieving his national security priorities.” The NIE adds that he, “may be willing to take greater conventional military risks, believing that nuclear weapons will deter an unacceptably strong U.S. or South Korean response.”  

Still, more ominously, the NIE says that Kim’s regime ”most likely will continue to use its nuclear weapons status to support coercive diplomacy, and almost certainly will consider increasingly risky coercive actions as the quality and quantity of its nuclear and ballistic missile arsenal grow.” 

With North Korea thus far ignoring even unconditional talks offered by Biden, North Korea’s breakneck efforts to attain greater nuclear and missile capabilities have reinforced a dangerous cycle of action and reaction: Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, a frequent top spokesperson, recently threatened to shoot down U.S. surveillance planes even though they were flying over international waters near the North Korean coast. 

With each step to enhance North Korea’s nuclear capacity, there has, as Newton’s Third Law of Motion warned, been an equal and opposite U.S. and South Korean reaction, ratcheting up tensions. Thus, there have been more U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises and more U.S.-South Korea-Japan defense cooperation. The U.S. has stepped up efforts to respond to Seoul’s nuclear fears — and popular support for nuclear weapons.  

The U.S. has gone to extraordinary lengths to reassure South Koreans. The centerpiece of the April U.S.-South Korean Summit was the Washington Declaration, which established new mechanisms for closer regulation consultation on nuclear planning, including tabletop nuclear exercises. To underscore U.S. nuclear deterrence commitments to Seoul, the White House has taken unprecedented moves, sending U.S. nuclear-capable bombers and nuclear missile submarines to South Korea, the first of what may be periodic shows of force to underscore the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. 

Predictably, each U.S. action has triggered angry, threatening North Korean responses. This raises the risk of Pyongyang miscalculating and sparking conflict. 

Why? North Korea has enshrined its nuclear status in a 2012 constitution. Last year, it passed a new law articulating its nuclear doctrine of first use if Kim deemed a threat imminent or even felt there were preparations for a nuclear attack. With the absence of regular communication or crisis-response mechanisms between Pyongyang and Washington or Seoul, these moves dramatically raise the risk of miscalculation and accidental conflict — like shooting down U.S. surveillance planes. 

North Korea recently sent drones over South Korea, prompting Seoul to scramble fighter jets and launch a $440 million counter-drone military program.  Even before Pyongyang acquired its current missile and nuclear arsenal, it has periodically militarily provoked South Korea, often to assert claims to the Northern limit line, the sea border between North and South. In 2010, Kim attacked a South Korean military facility on Yeonpyeong Island, in an exchange of fire killing two soldiers and two South Korean civilians. That same year, Pyongyang sunk the Cheonan, a small South Korean Navy ship, killing 46 sailors. Kim’s military provocations are ongoing and frequent — last April, the South Korean Navy repelled a North Korean ship that intruded into its waters. 

How emboldened might Kim feel now with his full spectrum missile and nuclear arsenal in place? The worst-case scenario would be a situation where the U.S. is in a hot war, for example, a military conflict with China in response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Kim might see a diverted U.S. as an opportunity to attack South Korea and fulfill the long-time fantasy of reunification on North Korea’s terms.  

As the NIE argues, such a use of force to dominate, not just provoke, South Korea is unlikely. But in a period of U.S.-China rivalry and an increasingly unsettled Northeast Asia, this wicked predicament just gets nastier. If there is a saving grace, it is as the NIE points out, Kim is not suicidal. Kim knows as Biden reminded him last April, that any North Korean nuclear attack would be “the end” of his regime.  

Americans tend to think that all problems have solutions. But after nearly 30 years of failed diplomacy with North Korea, there are arguably some problems that can only be managed, not solved. And even if well-managed, North Korea may have a strategic surprise in store for everyone. 

Robert A. Manning is a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center. He previously served as senior counselor to the undersecretary of State for global affairs, as a member of the U.S. secretary of state’s policy planning staff and on the National Intelligence Council Strategic Futures Group. Follow him on Twitter @Rmanning4. 

We cannot allow this to happen in Ukraine, for the consequences there and elsewhere would be unbearable. 

At NATO’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, there is no time for old men. Young men's thinking is required. And as New NATO has consistently been showing the way, Old NATO must recognize the birth and renewal of freedom in supporting Ukraine’s fight against Russia.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky embodies that youthful fount of spirit and resolve — something not fully present in the actions and decisions of President Joe Biden and his risk-averse administration. 

To be clear, Biden has done a considerable amount of good in ensuring Ukraine keeps living to fight another day. But he was far too slow out of the gates, and he is being far too timid now.

Defending liberty never was nor can ever be risk free. Wars are not won playing it safe, but by going on the offensive and risking defeat — or severe repercussions if victory is not achieved. 

As NATO's member-states meet in Vilinius, the U.S. is at an inflection point. To block Russian President Vladimir Putin from imposing his vision of a new, autocratic, multipolar world, we must shift the paradigm. 

Washington and Brussels can no longer afford to sit back in the "escalation paralysis" seen so far in this conflict. Rather, the paralysis must be forced upon Putin and his cronies in the Kremlin. It is they who should fear the power of freedom, not us who should fear the decrepit stench of Russian tyranny. Likewise, China's communist regime should fear going down a similar path in Taiwan.

The risk that must be taken now is to fast-track Ukraine to NATO membership. Biden should not be slow-walking the process. It is not his place to say that Kyiv has not yet earned the right.

The largest war in Europe since World War II is already playing out. Ukraine, mainly equipped, trained and mentored by NATO partners, is the bulwark presently protecting all of NATO from Russian aggression.

Kyiv’s accession to NATO has already been paid for in the blood of its soldiers who have fought valiantly now for more than 500 days against a nuclear superpower willing to commit nearly every conceivable type of war crime in order to win. Ukraine’s civilians during that time frame have endured Russian massacres and withstood constant and intentional targeting by the Kremlin of Ukrainian non-combatants with missiles. They have stood strong and united in the face of Putin’s "special military operation."

Accession should, of course, come with caveats. For instance, Ukraine should be prevented from invoking Article 5 until this war is over, unless Russia employs nuclear weapons, destroys nuclear power plants, or deploys other weapons of mass destruction such as germ warfare. This, at least initially, would prevent NATO from being immediately drawn into a hot war with Russia.

Critically, however, even such a provisional version of Ukrainian membership in NATO should give Putin pause. His Russian state-controlled media talking heads and pundits, who clamor for dropping nukes on Washington, London and Berlin, would have to think twice about risking a nuclear or WMD option. 

This would also turn Biden’s "escalation paralysis" into Putin’s by taking nuclear fears from the table. 

Unfortunately, however, as NATO’s elected leaders meet in Vilnius Tuesday and Wednesday, any appetite that existed for this kind of boldness has already been dashed. Biden has announced Ukraine is not ready for NATO membership. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg admirably came closest to this kind of bold approach by pushing a concrete plan outlining Kyiv’s accession. But after Biden’s declaration, he was forced to backtrack and offered instead watered-down promises in its place.

For now, the old men in NATO are prevailing. They are playing it safe. Meanwhile, the young men of Ukraine and the Ukrainian civilians on the home-fronts across their war-torn country are paying the price. 

Enough is enough. Old men have risen before in defense of liberty — namely Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. The Atlantic Charter they forged on August 14, 1941, aboard the U.S.S. Augusta in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, represented a decision by two old men to find their inner, younger selves and risk all in defense of liberty against Nazi tyranny.

It is that same kind of resolute spirit that Biden is decisively lacking as NATO holds its meetings in Vilnius. 

There is still time for Biden to correct course. The old men of NATO can and should be inspired by the young men of Ukraine — and by a young Zelensky, who is aging before our very eyes under the burden that the defense of freedom entails. 

Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy and is an economist, entrepreneur, and former board member of the World Trade Center, St. Louis. Jonathan Sweet, a retired Army Colonel and 30-year military intelligence officer, led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012 to 2014. 

An extraordinary event just occurred in Russia. The head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, turned against the Russian military, preemptively sending his forces to within 120 miles of Moscow. His aim was to protest both the derelict way the war was being waged in Ukraine and his disgust with Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of Defense General Valery Gerasimov and the transfer of his group to Ministry of Defense control.  

Within 24 hours the dispute was apparently ended by the intervention of Belarus’s President Alexander Lukashenko. But the consequences are unclear and this bizarre confrontation may not be over. This protest was not an attempted coup, but nonetheless, raises profound issues for NATO. 

Will Prigozhin’s preemptive strike overshadow the summit? NATO planners doubtlessly are focused on analyzing what and why this happened, as well as the consequences for NATO and the “no-limits” Russo-Sino partnership. This will be made more difficult in that NATO has only a few days to sort this out before the summit.

The summit was otherwise concentrating on the formal entry of Finland to the alliance and now the unlikely accession of Sweden given Turkey’s objections. Raising defense spending to meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product goal was on the agenda. And membership for Ukraine will be tempered by promises of support “for as long as it takes,” deferring it until after the war ends and the time is right. Meanwhile, NATO may agree to transfer longer-range fires to Ukraine.

To ease Ukraine’s entry into NATO, as a first step, Kyiv could be invited to join the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) — led by the United Kingdom and fellow NATO members Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden (awaiting approval) and Norway — de facto or as an observer. However, dealing with Russia becomes the dominant issue. Here are a few realities.

No matter whether Putin remains in power, Russia’s military has been more than decimated in terms of men and material. That means Moscow will have to rebuild its forces. That will take considerable time and money. Remember how long it took the U.S. to recover from the post-Vietnam War “Hollow Force.”

One consequence is that the bulk of Russia’s remaining military strength is nuclear: 1,550 strategic warheads and some 4,500 so-called tactical nuclear weapons. That could lead to a dramatic shift in Russian strategy returning to the earlier days of the Cold War and greater reliance on nuclear weapons. A new arms race could be provoked.

Another possibility, no matter how remote, certainly bears scrutiny. The events appeared staged, contrived and orchestrated. The compressed timetable from the seizure of Rostov on the Don to the end of the crisis and the intervention of Lukashenko could be a coincidence.  

But that may not be the case. Maskirovka, classic Russian and Soviet deception, should not be ruled out. Of course, one counterargument — the Wagner Group shooting down several Russian helicopters as it marched north — suggests otherwise. If this were staged, why would there have been these firefights?

Unknown is the future of Prigozhin and the Wagner Group. Once reported to be in Belarus, Prigozhin may be in St. Petersburg, which would contradict his self-exile. And if he returns to Belarus, what could this mean?

Suppose Putin was indeed desperate to reverse the course of the Ukraine war. An attack by the Wagner Group from Belarus, against Ukraine, would certainly disrupt Kyiv’s offensive. And an attack could cut the logistics lines from Poland on which Ukraine is vitally dependent. Indeed, this strikingly bold scenario is an extension of how “little green men” swarmed into Crimea in 2014.

Further, Putin’s threat to station tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus could have been a precursor for this scenario. With nuclear weapons present in Belarus, would NATO be prevented from taking strong retaliatory action? And do not foreclose Putin engineering some crisis to disrupt the summit.

The summit has been turned on its head by this stunning turn of events. How NATO responds is crucial. Platitudes won’t work. It is time for some very, very serious thinking. But is NATO capable, and at such short notice?

Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is a senior adviser at Washington, D.C.’s Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” doctrine.  His 12th book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD:  How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s abortive putsch demonstrated the fragility of the Russian regime and the stress it now faces. And so for the U.S., there are two operative questions to consider. First, how can the U.S. pressure the Russian state as a whole through more intense military activity? Second, how can we exploit internal divisions within Russia, and between Russia and Belarus?

Most substantive details on the Prigozhin incident will remain classified for decades, or at least until there is enough of a thaw between Russia and the West to enable the open exchange of archival material from the current war. Yet the outlines are increasingly clear.  Discounting the possibility of a Russian false-flag — not impossible but nevertheless extremely improbable — the incident demonstrates a deep degree of state erosion within Russia.

Before his invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s greatest strength was, ironically, his soft touch. The FSB functioned as secret police, a nascent Gulag system existed, and there were a number of arbitrary, politically-motivated detentions, including of opposition figure Alexei Navalny. There were also murders at home and abroad. 

But in general, for an authoritarian, Putin ruled with a relatively light hand. The Russian elite were able to come and go as they pleased, sending their children to tony schools in Europe and the U.S. and stashing their mistresses in Switzerland and Miami. The urban professional classes of Moscow and Saint Petersburg were also allowed to live largely as they pleased, and even conduct some subversive activity in foreign universities. Academics could travel with relative ease, while foreign businessmen and tourists remained a common sight in European Russia. 

Putin's was an illiberal regime even then, which at times crossed the line into open violence and had a fundamentally antagonistic relationship with its Ukrainian neighbor and the entire Anglosphere. But for Europeans and well-to-do Russians, this was a regime with which business could be done. 

Putin and his inner circle constructed this system by design. The intention was never to resurrect the full horror of the Stalin-era NKVD. Putin and his inner circle have not a scintilla of morality among them, yet they recognized the massive expense and risk that a wholesale security state would entail.

Most importantly, a well-resourced, powerful security state is also a potential threat to the executive. This is why Putin, in classic authoritarian fashion, established overlapping security institutions that would battle one another — the FSB, the GRU, the SVR, the FSO, the National Guard and even private military companies, of which Wagner was just one. The sheer complexity of this organizational structure ensures that no one accumulates enough power to become capable of seizing control of the state. 

Even so, this non-rationalized system has obvious seams, one of which Prigozhin exploited to march on Moscow. Putin could try to fix this by rationalizing the system, but that risks elevating a contender for his own position of power. 

Prigozhin’s putsch indicated the degree to which the Russian system is both divided and passive. As in most mutinies and coups, most state organs sat on the sidelines until the balance of forces became clear.  The amount of internal support for Prigozhin remains unknowable, but it is likely that some elements of the inner circle, along with the remaining pre-Putin oligarchs and part of the Russian military, either oppose the war in general or want to see Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov removed for incompetence. Reforming the system would risk giving one of those camps legitimate access to power, while also incapacitating each of the other security actors. 

The U.S. can exploit this system. There should be no expectation that a post-Putin Russia will be more amenable to the West, but sufficient pressure on this system could at least force an end to this war on favorable terms. The Russian system now has several interlocking strategic considerations that sap strategic attention and overload the state’s cognitive abilities. The U.S. can intensify this overload by taking four steps. 

First, the U.S. should take advantage of disorder in Russia and flood the information space with accusations of coups, plots, mutinies and other disruptive actions. The Russian state, at this point, cannot avoid following up on such leads, lest it miss a major event like Prigozhin’s coup attempt. The goal should be to distract and divide Russian decisionmaking and compel the Russian security apparatus to shift resources from Ukraine to internal protection. 

Second, the U.S. should provide structured, public incentives to any high-worth individual who might break ranks with Putin’s current policy. This might involve a degree of asset protection, amnesty from prosecution, or some other mix of favorable incentives. The difficulty of this policy is in public messaging. Ukraine and Eastern Europe will object to any outreach within Russia, but the U.S. cannot afford missing an opportunity to manipulate a major adversary. China will be doing the same, and American inaction today will allow Chinese penetration. 

Third, the U.S. should attempt to induce Belarus to separate itself somewhat from Russia. Since the 2020 protests against his fraudulent re-election, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has been solidly under Putin’s thumb.  But he has resisted being drawn into the Ukraine war and, prior to 2020, was extraordinarily coy in positioning himself between Russia and Ukraine to gain leverage over Moscow. 

Lukashenko's patronage of Prigozhin also seems designed to distance him from the Kremlin. A full break between Minsk and Moscow is highly improbable, absent a modification of the broader circumstances.  But marginal steps can be taken in the intelligence space, for example, to reduce Belarus’s accommodation of Russian forces. 

Fourth, the U.S. can increase its pressure on Russian positions beyond Ukraine, particularly in the Middle East. Russia retains significant air defense capabilities in Syria, despite its major redeployments to Ukraine. This is to preserve its leverage over Israel, even as Russia expands cooperation with Iran. Israel is unwilling to cut ties with Russia if Moscow can still influence a conflict in the Levant. 

Increased American pressure on Russian assets in the Levant would provide Israel with breathing space and reduce Russia’s ability to maintain a Moscow-Tehran pipeline with greater Israeli freedom of action.

Regime change need not be the U.S. course of action. But the Kremlin is weak and divided. The Biden administration would benefit from taking advantage of the situation to push its adversary. 

Seth Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy and is the author of Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Supremacy and Seablindness: How Political Neglect is Choking American Seapower and What to Do about it. 

I remember my March 2016 trip to Cuba, back when then-President Obama was in the process of normalizing diplomatic relations and the Cuban people were finally tasting the hope of freedom, capitalism and a better life. None of us knew then that the door would be slammed shut by then-President Trump just one year later.

At the time, I was mayor of Miami Beach and leading a delegation of Tufts University graduate students to the island, making me the first Miami official to travel to Cuba since the revolution. My trip coincided with Obama’s own historic trip when he delivered a message of hope and optimism to the Cuban people.

“In the United States,” he said, “we have a clear monument to what the Cuban people can build: it’s called Miami.”

Obama’s critics misunderstood his strategy. They assumed he was giving up on changing the situation in Cuba, when in reality he was giving us our best chance yet to transform Cuba into a free and open society. The old approach of extreme sanctions had failed, so he was trying something new: empowering the Cuban people with capitalist opportunities.

He knew that the most powerful force at our disposal is not hard power or diplomatic pressure, but rather what I like to think of as the American capitalist military. It is replete with a Navy comprised of American cruise lines; an Army made up of Hyatt, Hilton, Home Depot, McDonald’s and other retailers, and an Air Force of American Airlines, United, Delta and JetBlue.

This capitalist military would have rushed in and transformed Cuban society, bringing tourism and economic development to the island, raising the standard of living, and bringing an educational and cultural exchange that would have richly benefited both the U.S. and Cuba. 

Sadly, before our capitalist forces could invade, Trump shut the deal down, claiming that the Cuban government didn’t open up in a reciprocal manner. Even more sadly, Obama’s own vice president — now President Biden — has maintained Trump’s hard line on several policies.

Today, we’re reaping the rotten fruits of this ongoing miscalculation. Discussions between Cuban and Chinese officials to open a joint military training facility on Cuba’s northern coast are reported to be “at an advanced stage” and could lead to the “stationing of Chinese troops and other security and intelligence operations” just 100 miles off the Florida coast.

As Yogi Berra said, “It’s déjà vu all over again.” Here we are replaying the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, only this time it’s the Chinese rushing in to fill the void that the U.S. has left behind.

This is all too preventable. In the 62 years since the U.S. severed diplomatic ties with the island nation, there have been virtually no indications that the strategy is working, yet there have been many clear examples of it backfiring for U.S. security and the well-being of the Cuban people. The only real hope came when Obama reversed course. If we had stayed on the path he set us on, we would face a very different situation today.

Instead of Russian and Chinese naval vessels in Havana Harbor, we could have cruise ships there with thousands of visiting American tourists. Instead of Chinese troops stationed in Cuba, we could have America’s great consumer brands stationed there, along with American customers spreading American dollars to empower locals to make the change they envision for their nation.

Instead, America has less influence, the Cuban people have less hope and China has more power in the Western hemisphere — right off our southern flank.

Let’s hope Biden — or whoever comes next — can learn the lessons of history and put us back on a course to normalization with Cuba. That way, the American capitalist military can do what it does best: spread freedom, opportunity and hope.

Philip Levine, a cruise industry entrepreneur, is a former two-term mayor of Miami Beach and one-time Democratic candidate for governor of Florida.

If Ukraine had voted to rejoin Russia, or if the Taiwanese people were to elect to become part of China, Americans would have no grounds to object. But it is President Putin’s unwarranted use of force against Ukraine, and President Xi’s threat to use force against Taiwan, that are creating a growing risk of confrontation among the world’s leading nuclear powers.

Clearly, Americans' concerns are not based on animosity toward the Chinese or Russian peoples. Both countries have magnificent achievements and incredible histories. There are also innumerable personal friendships and many economic connections linking the U.S., Russia and China. Indeed, prior to Presidents Xi and Putin, tourism and trade between these countries and the U.S. were growing.

That has all changed now, solely as the result of two aggressive dictators who brook no dissent at home and seek to expand their empires abroad.

For Putin, it started with Georgia, then later Crimea and finally Ukraine. President Xi’s policies, meanwhile, have involved oppression of the Tibetan and Uyghur peoples and more recently the residents of Hong Kong. Now Xi is threatening Taiwan and China’s neighbors in the South China Sea. The fact that the Taiwanese people enjoy greater freedom and a higher standard of living than their peers in the People’s Republic of China should generate introspection and reform in China, not threats of violence against Taiwan. 

Instead, Xi tries to pretend America and its allies are seeking to restrain China’s growth and prosperity. But as a capitalist nation, we prosper from trading with China as it grows. It is only Xi's hostile, aggressive policies that are raising tensions.

Similarly, Vladimir Putin seeks to deflect any personal responsibility for Western sanctions by claiming aggressive intentions on the part of NATO member states — countries that until his invasion of the Ukraine had been neglecting military preparations and spending for decades.

We cannot afford to allow either dictator to succeed in using these false arguments to avoid personal responsibility their current tensions with the U.S. and its allies.  

Both leaders are becoming increasingly aggressive and megalomaniacal. Xi especially seems to view himself as an oracle, almost a demi-god, whose thoughts and utterances all members of the Communist party must constantly study. He is inserting his personal views into virtually every aspect of life inside China, from the boardroom to the classroom. This is happening in tandem with a truly Orwellian scheme already well underway, to employ modern surveillance technologies to monitor each Chinese citizen’s movement, behavior, and communications. 

North Korea is already a surreal, tragic dystopia. However, due to its lack of influence, we can largely ignore it. But how long can we peacefully coexist with a China that is becoming a vastly more powerful, nationalistic cult-state following one man’s dictates? It is a daunting prospect, and we ought to be taking every reasonable step we can to prevent Xi from turning China into a massive, aggressive, cult-state like North Korea.  

Among the many things we need to do to confront these dangerous dictators is align our rhetoric with our concerns. We need to help the Chinese and Russian people understand that we want to return to friendly and prosperous relations. They also need to recognize that rising tensions with the U.S. are purely the result of the aggressive and intolerant policies of their current leaders. 

Much as Ronald Reagan helped to accelerate the end the cold war by calling the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” we should begin referring to Russia as “The Putin State” and China as the “Xi State.” After all, these men have total control and call the shots without limit or accountability.

Both men resent having the spotlight placed on them personally, and for good reason. If adopted, this new approach would change the terms of debate in our favor by making both men, and the unfettered power they have amassed a constant focus of domestic and international attention. This would put both leaders on the defensive, while challenging the legitimacy of their rule.

This change in emphasis would help to reframe and clarify the sources of tension between our great nations in a powerful way, eroding the narrative of Western antipathy towards the populations of both of these great nations. Both men will hate it; many of their citizens will be duly embarrassed and resentful, but that will be all for the better in the vital war for public opinion.

Xi and Putin, after all, are solely responsible for the dangerously aggressive policies that are generating rising tensions and the risk of war. Those tensions could disappear overnight if more reasonable leaders emerged and less aggressive policies were adopted.

U.S. policy is critically dependent on maintaining strong alliances and the support of other nations. Being clear about what we object to and what we seek is therefore critically important.

Such a change in rhetoric, to call out Xi and Putin by name, would promote debate at home and abroad about Xi and Putin’s intolerant and oppressive policies and make their conduct and growing usurpation of power an important and continuing topic of discussion. After all, what could be less equitable than placing total power in the hands of a single individual?

The proposed change in vernacular requires no taxpayer expenditures, yet it could have more long-term impact than adding another aircraft carrier to the fleet. We need to be clear about our concerns and do everything we can to focus attention on the unjust policies of two egomaniacal dictators placing the world at increased risk of destruction. That requires putting the onus for rising tensions on the shoulders of Xi and Putin, where it belongs.

Christopher Mellon is former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, following the Russian spy base established in Lourdes, the Bejucal facility, and finally with the 2019 chapter involving Chinese espionage, Havana’s regime has continued to open its doors to America's most dangerous geopolitical enemies.

In 1960, Cuba became the first country in Latin America to establish diplomatic relations with communist China. Since then, political, military, and economic exchanges have been increasing, particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Last November, China approved $100 million to rescue Cuba from its self-inflicted economic collapse. The Asian superpower has reiterated its interest in strengthening this historical and strategic relationship.

Although Havana and Beijing have maintained a spy base since 2019, intelligence cooperation between the two countries has continued above and beyond that. According to the Wall Street Journal, the two regimes are negotiating the establishment of a joint military training base on the island, just 100 miles away from the Florida coast.

The U.S. has also reported the activities of the Chinese telecommunications giants Huawei and ZTE in the same area where the spy base is supposed to be located.

This century, the Castro dictatorship and its progeny have helped forge and maintain the current dictatorships of Venezuela and Nicaragua, both politically and militarily. Cuban advisers are present in these two countries to pull the strings, offering intelligence support and training to their police and armies.

Cuba also maintains a close political and ideological relationship with leftist presidents in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Brazil and Mexico have supported the Cuban medical brigades, considered a model of modern slavery. According to the human rights organization Prisoners Defenders, the regime keeps 94 percent of the salaries received by 50,000 doctors in different parts of the world.

Since the early days of the Cuban revolution and the Missile Crisis, Russia has been the main military partner of Cuba's regime. Last week, Russian Defense Minister Serguei Shoigu met with his Cuban counterpart Alvaro Lopez Miera.

After the abortive rebellion by Wagner mercenaries in Russia, Putin has reportedly looked to Cuba for more soldiers to continue his war of aggression against Ukraine. According to Prisoners Defenders, Russia and Cuba have reached an agreement that would send Cuban soldiers to Ukraine, paying each of them $2,000 per month. But the island's dictatorship would naturally keep between 75 percent and 95 percent of their income since this is how dictatorships work.

While China advances its commercial relationships in Latin America, seizing key industries such as lithium, copper and telecommunications, Cuba has an extensive political and ideological network throughout Latin America and even in the U.S. through the Sao Paulo Forum and the so-called solidarity networks.

Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) and Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) are calling on the Biden administration to give a classified briefing regarding the reported Chinese spy facility in Cuba.

Given the political, economic and security threat posed by Cuba and China, a comprehensive response is urgently needed. Partnerships with other democratic nations in Latin America should be strengthened, both in the field of security and in commercial matters.

It would be a very big mistake to neglect such hemispheric threats or underestimate the dangerous strategies of such regimes as China, Cuba and Russia.

Arturo McFields Yescas is a former Nicaraguan ambassador to the Organization of American States, an exiled journalist, and a former member of the Peace Corps of Norway.

How was Prigozhin able to move so quickly? First, take note of a message sent by Prigozhin’s deputy, Andrey Troshev, to all army units in southern Russia. It says that “from June 21 to July 5, Wagner will be moving its units” to Russia to “sign an agreement with Russian security structure (not a Ministry of Defense).” Vladimir Osechkin of Gulagu.net, a specialist in all things Wagner, vouches for its authenticity.

This is how Wagner managed so quickly to capture Rostov, the main logistical hub for Russia's war in Ukraine. Prigozhin was moving units even before he announced his rebellion.

Vladimir Osechkin also claims that the mercenaries were told they were marching “to help Putin,” who wants to fire the minister of defense but needs some clout. To an outsider, this level of deception may seem psychotic, but anybody who studied Prigozhin’s troll farms will recognize his signature style.

It appears that Prigozhin’s first goal was to capture the Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu in his Rostov headquarters. But Shoigu fled. The two men left behind to parlay with Prigozhin included Russian military intelligence (GRU) General Vladimir Alekseev.

Alekseev, a native of Ukraine, is one of the masterminds of this war. He is rumored to be the top spy overseeing Russian intelligence operations in the West, including the Skripal poisoning. He is also the one who created Wagner. Its current military commander, Dmitry Utkin, is his personal friend.

Alekseev seemed to be the emissary of Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Security Council and the man who was left by Putin to fight the rebels, while Putin went off to Saint Petersburg to watch his favorite water festival from the board of a new yacht. It would have been wise to treat such a man with respect. Instead, Prigozhin exhibited him in a video as a captured prize.

Prigozhin remained at the Rostov headquarters while Utkin marched on to Moscow. Utkin is a brilliant commander. He is also a man who has tattooed himself with Nazi shoulder straps and named his unit after Hitler’s favorite composer.

By this time, the coup was doomed. The Federal Security Service (FSB) had been alerted by June 22 at the latest. This tallies with Christo Grozev of Bellingcat's report of a frantic surge of communication between the FSB, the GRU and the Federal Protective Service. If the Wagner chief expected the FSB to take his side, he was deceived.

According to my sources, the FSB had lists of locals who served in Wagner. These people were apprehended immediately after Prigozhin struck. Meanwhile, some 70 miles from Moscow, where the Oka River crosses the Rostov highway and adjacent roads, five bridges across the river were blocked and loaded with explosives with plenty of troops lying in wait. It would have been a bloodbath.

It appears that Patrushev was well-prepared for the coup, albeit in a peculiar way. Were Prigozhin crushed at Oka, this would have demonstrated the utter cluelessness of President Putin and made Patrushev the biggest guy in the city. Patrushev is the closest friend of Putin, a head of what may be called “the deep KGB,” and one of the only two people who reputedly had access to Putin in his bunker. He has also been spouting conspiracy theories left and right, talking of George Soros controlling European parliaments and U.S. corporations swatting "four U.S. presidents" like flies.

But Patrushev wasn’t the ultimate victor because Prigozhin stopped before reaching the river. The man who talked him into stopping was Alexei Dyumin, the governor of the Tula region and an ally to Yury Kovalchuk, a billionaire and Putin's second-closest friend, reputedly a main influence behind the Ukraine war with truly bizarre ideas. His brother says the Western elites are currently engaged in creating genetically modified “serving people” and suppressing Western countries' birthrates through "gay propaganda."

It wasn’t simply stopping Prigozhin, it was more about preventing Patrushev’s triumph. Putin was as much as non-existent in all this. In fact, the only explanation for him letting “the traitor” live is the copious amount of blackmail Prigozhin can possess. After all, the guy was the head of Putin’s private army, first in Ukraine and later in Africa. There should be some pretty heavy stuff over there, not your usual run-of-the-mill corruption.

This all may seem highly convoluted and a conspiracy theory. Point is, all these people are ardent conspiracy theorists. And conspiracy theorists at the helm of security and military services engage in conspiracies that never pan out as planned.

The good news is that Prigozhin and Putin both lost. The bad news is that the people who benefited the most and stand to control post-Putin Russia are, frankly, nuts.

Did I mention that Alexei Dyumin’s biggest qualification for his current governor’s job is that he was Putin’s bodyguard? This is what qualified him to parlay with Putin’s chef.

Russia’s lay bureaucracy is surprisingly sound. Its state security elite, on the other hand, is the three-ring circus described above. Putin created it in his image, and now he reaps what he sowed.

Perhaps the telling fact is that even these crazy guys want to stop the war. Either way, it’s the biggest cliffhanger in the Ukraine series so far. And Putin looks like a fruit ripe for plucking, but not before he loses his war. That way, whoever survives can safely pin the military failures on him.

Yulia Latynina, a journalist and a writer, worked for Echo of Moscow radio station and the Novaya Gazeta newspaper until they were shut down as part of the current war in Ukraine. She is a recipient of the U.S. State Department’s Defender of Freedom award.

But less than two years since the last soldier left Afghanistan, reality continues to dash that hope. Afghanistan is once again becoming a gathering place for terror groups to train, organize and launch attacks on the rest of the world.

That’s the conclusion of a report released publicly in June by the United Nations committee overseeing U.N. sanctions against the Taliban. The Taliban-controlled Afghan reality that the report describes includes a score of terrorist groups, both regional and worldwide in scope, living unmolested, conducting terror activities and growing more numerous in 2023 than they were the year before.  

According to the report’s summary, “the link between the Taliban and both Al-Qaida and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan remains strong and symbiotic. A range of terrorist groups have greater freedom of maneuver under the Taliban de facto authorities. They are making good use of this, and the threat of terrorism is rising in both Afghanistan and the region.” 

The Taliban welcomes all these groups, according to the report, except for the local Islamic State affiliate known as ISIL-K. But the Taliban seems curiously unable to neutralize ISIL, despite having a chokehold on every other aspect of Afghan security.

We are longtime observers of Afghanistan and international security policy who are troubled not only by this frighteningly negative trend but also by the accommodationist Western response.

The evidence contained in this latest U.N. report challenges the arguments we heard two years ago, that we could contain the rebuilding of terror networks in Afghanistan with an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism capability. By leaving as we did, the U.S. betrayed and disrupted its information networks in Afghanistan. Even a U.S. senior military official said in March that “over-the-horizon” isn’t going to keep us safe against a determined foe.

Not-so-secret talks between the CIA and Taliban to cooperate against ISIL-K are a mistake on many levels, as it prioritizes a tactical goal over the strategic problem of embroiling the U.S. in a partnership with a known terrorist group. Furthermore, as a noted United Kingdom sanctions export pointed out recently, the Taliban’s “Pashtun chauvinism” strengthens ISIL’s appeal to other ethnicities, and the shrinking economy and regime human rights abuses against former government officials also add to those willing to join ISIL.

Some have called for engaging with the Taliban because they are the “de facto” rulers. But we should consider more carefully what that would mean for our enduring national security interests. Do the advocates of engagement truly mean to open the door to a Taliban leader standing in front of the U.N. General Assembly, afforded the legitimacy of that body, spewing misogynistic hate and a call to violent action?

Within a few years, the external and internal forces of jihad will hold a captive audience of millions of people. The U.N. report documents a surge of foreign fighters relocating to Afghanistan; meanwhile, groups around the world see the Taliban’s rhetoric of a great victory through jihadist purity as a beacon and model. Afghan primary school children are now enrolled in revenge-fueled fundamentalist education. Young Afghan girls, forced out of education and employment, are becoming brides and mothers before their time.

We must do everything possible to keep and strengthen the biggest international policy tool we have: targeted, worldwide, U.N.-administered sanctions against Taliban leaders, imposed on the grounds that their actions are a threat to international peace and security. The U.N. Security Council, bitterly divided on most issues, has supported this sanctions regime, renewing it most recently in December 2022.  

The regime could be strengthened, and allies such as the United Kingdom could take the lead. It is time to add to the current list of sanctioned Taliban individuals, tighten the rules for travel ban, mandate closure of the Taliban’s office in Qatar and call for the return to Afghanistan of the relatives of listed Taliban officials — including their daughters who are sent abroad to study. 

Furthermore, the Taliban’s human rights abuses, such as killing prisoners and former government officials, torturing women and denying health services and food to the most vulnerable, are akin to using terrorism on the Afghan population. We would advocate other policy options that send a clear international message that these acts of domestic terror, in addition to their hosting of international jihadi groups, are further reasons that the Taliban cannot be treated as a legitimate representative of the Afghan people. 

We propose a ministerial event at the U.N. General Assembly that brings world leaders together with Afghan human rights defenders, and U.N.-sponsored talks among Afghan exile and in-country representatives, especially from the youth. We urge Afghans to act with urgency to overcome their divisions.

This report makes it clear that the U.S. must abrogate the 2020 Doha agreement. The Taliban clearly don’t believe they have to abide by it; why are we?

Additionally, we recommend the establishment of a U.K.-European Union joint task force specifically dedicated to monitoring and countering terrorist activities originating from Afghanistan, as well as violations of human rights within the country.

Finally, communications at a senior level pose a strategic risk by heightening the appearance of accepting the Taliban as a government. At a technical level, it remains necessary to work with Taliban authorities around the delivery of assistance and the safety of foreign citizens or Afghans eligible for relocation. But there is no reason to give up on our own national security interests while we do so.

The Taliban’s message since they abducted Afghanistan in 2021 has been, loud and clear, that they are beyond the reach of the international community. The U.N. Sanctions Committee report shows the danger of letting this go unchecked, let alone giving them the recognition they do not deserve.

Annie Pforzheimer, a retired career U.S. foreign service officer, is the former deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and senior non-resident associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Shabnam Nasimi is a former senior policy advisor to the United Kingdom Minister for Refugees and Minister for Afghan Resettlement.